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I. Introduction
Labor arbitration in the United States has matured to the point
that it is no longer adequate to guide new arbitrators with the apho-
rism that "labor arbitrators are not bound by arbitral precedent."
Prior awards of arbitrators are often presented as argument in arbi-
tration hearings. Advocates also refer to other arbitral decisions in
post-hearing briefs.' Arbitrators, then, need to reach a consensus
concerning the precedential value of arbitration awards, and they,
not judges, ought to decide questions about the binding effect of an
arbitration award on later grievances.'
Principles of law pertaining to judgments deal with the prece-
dential force of arbitration awards and suggest that awards rendered
in the same industry or involving the same parties and contractual
language should be considered as more persuasive authority than
awards without such characteristics. If, however, arbitrators first
consult external sources such as the Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments, unique features of labor arbitration may be lost in an increas-
ingly formal dispute resolution process.' Although some underlying
1. Dworkin, How Arbitrators Decide Their Cases, 25 LAB. L.J. 200, 204 (1974) ("The
truth is that the parties, as well as the arbitrator, grope for precedents like a security blan-
ket."). See also Jennings & Martin, The Role of Prior Arbitration Awards in Arbitral Deci-
sions, 28 LAB, L.J. 95 (1978); McPherson, Should Labor Arbitrators Play Follow the
Leader?, 4 (new series) ARB. J. 163 (1949); Seitz, The Citation of Authority and Precedent in
Arbitration (Its Use and Abuse), 38 ARB, J. 58 (1983).
2. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 430 (1985) ("While
prior awards have authoritative force in some situations, the great mass of awards are consid-
ered to have persuasive force only. Nothing is settled by saying that prior awards do or do not
have the force of precedent. Rather, it is essential that one recognize that precedential force of
prior awards always is a question of degree.").
Arbitrators have often assumed that there is a rigid devotion to precedent in the judicial
system. Arbitrator Burton Turkus stated in Brewers Bd. of Trade, Inc., 38 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
679, 680 (1962):
It is a fundamental concept of industrial relations that decisions of other arbitra-
tors unlike judicial precedent in the Courts, are neither necessarily controlling
nor decisive-but rather that each award in arbitration represents the judgment
of the arbitrator of what the agreement of the parties means and where the
equities lie. Thus, the doctrine of "stare decisis, et non quieta movers"-adhere
to precedents; do not unsettle things--does not apply in arbitration, as it does in
courts of law (where judicial precedent of a higher Court must be followed).
3. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960) ("[Tjhe choice is between the adjudication of cases or controversies in [the] courts
with established procedures [where] . . . even special statutory safeguards on the one hand
and the settlement of them in the more informal arbitration tribunal on the other."). See also
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policies may be relevant, formal rules of the law of judgments should
have only limited application in arbitration."
There are times when prior awards ought to be authoritative
and not merely persuasive for arbitrators. Every arbitration case has
its unique aspects, but few grievance arbitrators make decisions in a
vacuum. Influences outside of the collective bargaining agreement
often play a role in the decision making process. For example, after
over half a century of use, commonly accepted principles of arbitra-
tion have emerged. Those principles ought to be applied in a way
that encourages similar decisions in similar circumstances.'
R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 197 (1965), which stated,
Arbitrators have, happily, largely dispensed with the exclusionary rules of evi-
dence developed at common law or the jury trial system. One can say that this is
a happy result because, in the colorful language of Judge Traynor, "just as no
ohe would tell the emperor that he has no clothes, there are too few who would
whisper that the law of evidence has too many."
See also Ashe, Arbitration Finality: Myth or Reality?, 38 ARB. J. 42, 51 (1983) ("As arbitra-
tion becomes more formalized, the layman's role is diminished, thus making the arbitration
area more akin to a courtroom . . . . [W]e should not be so quick to emasculate the most
effective alternative dispute resolution system we possess.").
4. See generally Roth, When to Ignore the Rules of Evidence in Arbitration, 9 LITIGA-
TION, Winter 1983, at 20.
5. See Abrams, The Nature of the Arbitral Process: Substantive Decision-Making in
Labor Arbitration, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 551, 566-67 (1981).
While arbitration law is private law, it is fundamental error to think of this
private law as unique to each particular collective relationship. Even if the par-
ties desired to do so, they would be hard put to adjust and order their relation-
ship along sui generis lines ....
Unless they have indicated that they do not wish to adopt the body of principles
that would otherwise be used by an arbitrator in fulfilling his appointed role,
parties can be seen as having adopted the lex non scripta of the labor agreement
as their interpretive gloss.
Id. Dean Harry Shulman of the Yale Law School stated in his famous Holmes lectures at
Harvard Law School:
The awards must necessarily set precedents for recurring cases and the opinions
must necessarily provide guidance for the future in relating decision to reason
and to more or less mutually accepted principle. Consistency is not a lawyer's
creation. It is a normal urge and a normal expectation. It is part of the ideal of
equality of treatment.
ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE 177-78 (A. Zack ed. 1984).
Minimal differences in arbitration cases should not provide arbitrators with a basis for
failing to struggle with the precedential value of an award. Irene S. Ross, an administrative
law judge observed that
when a client comes to his attorney and asks the question, "Is it legal," the
attorney then researches the law to find similar fact situations which have been
decided by the courts and which stand as precedents upon which similar cases
may be adjudicated similarly because of the rule of stare decisis. If the fact
situation brought by the client is different, to the degree that the difference
makes a difference (a phrase which triggers a reaction in General Semanticists
because the recognize there is a difference to some degree between any two simi-
lar situations or things), and there is no precedent for this fpct situation, the
attorney tries to establish a new precedent in bringing this case to court.
Ross, General Semantics, Stare Decisis and Change Through Consideration of a New Ethics,
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Federal courts play an instrumental role in determining the au-
thoritativeness of arbitrator's decisions because the courts are fre-
quently asked to enjoin or compel arbitration, as well as to set aside
awards, based on arbitral precedent.6 In what has been popularly
described as the Steelworkers Trilogy, the United States Supreme
Court established a standard of judicial review for cases concerning
arbitration generally. 7 On occasion, some federal circuit courts have
applied the standard inconsistently."
In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union
of United Rubber Workers of America,9 the United States Supreme
Court discussed the need for arbitrators to move beyond aphorisms
about the absence of reliance on stare decisis in arbitration and to-
ward a more thoughtful, comprehensive approach to the precedential
value of prior arbitration awards. In W.R. Grace & Co., the Court
affirmed its adherence to the standards set forth in the Steelworkers
Trilogy and permitted an arbitrator to determine the precedential
8 J. NAT'L A. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 97, 100 (1988).
6. There is some conflict with regard to the frequency of judicial intervention into the
arbitration process. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 5, at 557 ("Otherwise one would expect to
see either an increase in attempts to vacate arbitration awards in court or an increase in speci-
ficity of contract provisions concerning the intended mode of arbitral decision making. Neither
has occurred."). See also Hogler, Industrial Due Process and Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards, 31 LAB. L.J. 570 (1980) (Mr. Hogler refers to an "increasing judicial scrutiny of
decisions in which the arbitrator purportedly acted beyond his or her authority . . . . Indeed,
judicial activism has been viewed as signalling the end of the 'golden age' of arbitration."). See
generally Feller, Arbitration: The Days of Its Glory are Numbered, 2 IND. REL. L.J. 97
(1977); Ashe, supra note 3.
7. The Supreme Court set forth the "essence test" of judicial review of an arbitration
award. The Court stated that an
award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bar-
gaining agreement . . . .It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained
for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract,
the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the
contract is different from his.
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-99 (1960).
The Court also set forth the "positive assurance" test: "[a]n order to arbitrate the particular
grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitra-
tion claim is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts
should be resolved in favor of coverage." United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). The other case in the Steelworkers Trilogy is
United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
8. See generally Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 530 F.2d 1048 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); Electronics Corp. of Am. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers
Local 272, 492 F.2d 1255 (1st Cir. 1974); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Distillery, Rectifying, Wine,
& A.W.I.U., 412 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1969); Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d
1123 (3d Cir. 1969); Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers Union, Local 1645, 362 F.2d
677 (2d Cir. 1966). See also St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A
Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977); Kaden,
Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
267 (1980).
9. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
ARBITRATOR'S USE OF PRECEDENT
value of a prior arbitration award.10 To promote industry expecta-
tions of stability and finality in arbitration, arbitrators should de-
velop a consistent philosophy of arbitral precedents. It is not unusual
to instruct new arbitrators that they are not bound by prior awards
while at the same time stating that arbitral interpretations of a col-
lective bargaining agreement, as set forth in an award, are incorpo-
rated into and merged with the parties' labor contract until changed
by subsequent negotiations. This inherent inconsistency has not been
successfully resolved, and unfortunately, if arbitrators fail to reach a
consensus about the precedential value of arbitration awards, it is
likely that courts will be asked to define the usefulness of prior
awards for arbitrators.
This Article evaluates the precedential value of prior awards in
subsequent labor arbitration proceedings. This Article does not at-
tempt to assess the precedential value of arbitration awards for
courts or for administrative agencies,11 nor does it investigate the
effect of court or agency rulings on arbitration proceedings.12
Rather, the focus is on one arbitrator's use of another arbitrator's
prior decision in disputes between labor and management. The Arti-
cle is organized into two parts. Part I discusses an approach that
may be applied by arbitrators when asked to give precedential value
to prior awards. This segment focuses on the determination of the
precedential value of a particular award, including an analysis of the
time period during which such precedential value is appropriate.
Part II examines federal court treatment of arbitration awards
involving precedent from prior arbitration proceedings. Although
10. Id. at 764. See also Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Local Union 54 v.
Adamar, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 795, 797 (D.N.J. 1987).
Although the Court recognizes that the Arbitrator has construed the same
contract differently on two occasions, it is clear that each proceeding presented a
different factual record for his consideration. Under the applicable standard of
review, it is beyond doubt that the arbitrator did not commit reversible error
.... This court is constrained by the narrow scope of review of the arbitrator's
award. Under that standard, this court finds that the award must be upheld.
Id.
I1. For precedential value of arbitration awards for courts or administrative agencies,
see McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955); Moss, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS § 10.03 (1986) (contains an ac-
count of the effect of collateral estoppel in administrative hearing on subsequent "action");
Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, The Proper Role of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in
Title VII Suits, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1980); North, NLRB: The Res Judicata Effect of
Representation Proceedings in Subsequent Technical 8(a)(5) Actions, 51 ALB. L. REV. 93, 112
(1986); Vestal & Hill, Jr., Preclusion in Labor Controversies, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 281, 329
(1982).
12. See M. Hill & A. Sinicropi, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 60 (1980); Note, Res Judi-
cata/Collateral Estoppel Effect of a Court Determination in Subsequent Arbitration, 45 ALB.
L. REV. 1029 (1981). See generally Vestal & Hill, Jr., supra note 11, at 310.
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courts generally agree that deference to arbitration constitutes an
aspect of national labor policy, 3 in practice, courts may rule on the
merits of an arbitration decision when asked to decide whether a
prior award should be regarded as precedential. 4 This Article con-
cludes that, absent express agreement by the parties, an arbitrator,
and not a judge, should decide the weight and duration of preceden-
tial value to be accorded previous awards, limited only by a "clearly
erroneous" standard of review.15
II. An Approach for Evaluating the Precedential Value of Awards
A. The Law of Judgments
The United States Supreme Court has held that grievance arbi-
tration in the labor-management context serves as a quid pro quo for
costly work stoppages.16 Arbitration is a "safety valve for trouble-
some complaints, ' 17 and is the accepted process for clarifying or in-
terpreting collective bargaining agreements." Grievances usually
13. The National Labor Relations Board has also adopted this position in regard to
unfair labor practice cases. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 840 (1971);
Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955). At least one commentator believes this
expansion of the use of arbitration conflicts with its function and informal character. See
Feller, supra note 6, at 110-13.
14. See, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Local 240, 718 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1983);
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1981);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 530 F.2d 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Electronics
Corp. of Am. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers Local 272, 492 F.2d
1255 (1st Cir. 1974); Torrington v. Metal Prods. Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.
1966); IBEW Local 199 v. United Tel. Co., 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2666 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
15. The proper standard of review for courts to use in deciding arbitrability is whether a
dispute is "arguably arbitrable." See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). See also Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Joint Bd., 417 U.S. 249
(1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); John Wiley & Sons v.
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Howan, The Prospective Effect of Arbitration, 7 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 60, 64 (1985); Rutledge, The Other Agreement to Arbitrate a Labor Dispute, 3 OHIO ST.
J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 79, 89 (1987); Snow, The Steelworkers Trilogy in Oregon's Public
Sector, 21 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 445 (1985); Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (1986); Note, ARBITRATION-Jurisdiction
from Participation, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 183 (1987); Note, Judicial Interpretation of
Collective Bargaining Agreements: The Danger Inherent in the Determination of Arbi-
trability, 1983 DUKE L.J. 848 (1983).
16. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
17. Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 ROCKY MTN. L.
REV. 247, 261 (1958). See also Ashe, supra note 3, at 51 ("Arbitration provides an informal
forum for employees and employers to vent their frustrations in a constructive manner.").
18. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 580. See also Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective
Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1985); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement,
69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956); Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MICH. L.
REV. 635 (1969); Grenig, Principles of Contract Interpretation: Interpreting Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements, 16 CAP. U.L. REV. 31 (1986); Snow, Contract Interpretation: The Plain
Meaning Rule in Labor Arbitration, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 681 (1987); Summers, Collective
Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525 (1969); Wellington, Freedom of
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concern only a relatively small amount of money, if any, or the em-
ployment of a few workers. In their totality, however, grievances re-
flect the essence of industrial life."9 Together with the parties, arbi-
trators share a role in helping the collective bargaining system of the
United States function efficiently. Therefore, arbitrators should be
able to rely upon judicial support as they assume their responsibility
in this system of industrial relations.20 This means that arbitrators
should be empowered to make final decisions regarding contractual
disputes between labor and management. Otherwise, disgruntled un-
ions and companies will turn elsewhere for finality, thereby under-
mining the uniquely American system for resolving labor-manage-
ment conflicts.
The common law system in the United States promotes finality,
judicial economy, uniform treatment of litigants, and stability by re-
lying on various principles in the law of judgments. Concepts of res
judicata, collateral estoppel, and stare decisis are useful abstractions
in our judicial framework for resolving societal disputes.2 Any help-
ful aspects of these concepts, which might increase certainty, stabil-
ity, and finality of labor arbitration awards, should be incorporated
into the body of principles upon which arbitrators rely in their deci-
sion making process. When a particular dispute is adjudicated in a
court of law or an arbitration proceeding, the parties have a right to
expect an end to litigation and institutional conflict. As a result,
there are times when the text of an arbitration decision deserves the
same scrutiny and authoritative force accorded judicial decisions.22
Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 467 (1964).
19. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator's Role, Proceedings of the Fif-
teenth Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators, at 8 (1962).
20. Abrams, supra note 5, at 553 ("The labor relations community must pay increasing
attention to the need to train new arbitrators who can take their place."). See generally, An-
derson, Arbitration and the Law: The Better Way, 30 LAB. L.J. 259, 265-67 (1979); Usery, Jr.,
Some Attempts to Reduce Arbitration Costs and Delays, 95 (Part II) MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3
(Nov. 1972).
21. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-99 (1948).
22. See General Portland Cement Co., 62-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8611 (1962). See
also Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 771.
The "texts" of judicial opinions thus come to be treated like statutes, constitu-
tions, and other legal texts. The language used in judicial opinions is studied and
analyzed in much the same way that one would puzzle and agonize over the
precise wording of a statute, constitution, or a literary work. The language of the
opinion takes on canonical or formulaic status. It begins to command authority
in its own right, rather than merely as a report on how the decision was reached.
Id. at 813-14.
Terms involving the concept of preclusion may not always be used with precision. See
Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1975); Fleming v. Cooper, 225 Ark. 634,
284 S.W.2d 857 (1955). See also Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the
Doctrine of Issue Preclusion Make an Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a
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A discussion of terms may be useful at this point because some
arbitrators, as well as judges, may intermingle terms and meanings
to describe decisions having precedential value. The terms of imme-
diate interest are res judicata, collateral estoppel, and stare decisis.
Recognizing that the customary teachings of these doctrines are not
binding on arbitrators, the question to be asked is whether arbitra-
tors ought to take the teachings more seriously, even to the point of
giving prior awards authoritative force.
1. Res Judicata.-Res judicata, or the frequently used
equivalent of claim preclusion, means that a dispute has been de-
cided and that a final decision has been made on the merits of a
case. The central premise of res judicata is that it is inefficient to
separate a cause of action. As the Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments makes clear: "When a valid and final personal judgment is
rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the claim is generally merged in
the judgment."23 Res judicata in labor arbitration means that a
party to the arbitration proceeding is prevented from rearbitrating a
claim that was or could have been arbitrated in the prior hearing
that resulted in an arbitration decision. In addition, if the party filing
the demand for arbitration receives an adverse decision, a subse-
quent action on the same claim is barred."'
The concept of res judicata promotes an efficient system of dis-
pute resolution. A decision by a judge or an arbitrator sets forth the
rights and duties of the parties and enables them to make rational
plans for the future. Denying the right to relitigate a claim also pre-
vents the parties from using the claim as a means of harassment. In
addition, res judicata gives finality to a decision maker's determina-
tion, and this finality promotes the moral authority of an arbitrator
while encouraging parties to use the dispute resolution system in an
effective manner.
Court of Law?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 65-66 (1986) ("While some courts have used 'res
judicata' as a catchall term for both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, the doctrines have
different origins and serve distinct functions."). Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estop-
pel: Using Preclusion to Shape Procedural Choices, 63 TULANE L. REV. 29, 75 (1988) ("Col-
lateral estoppel is said to apply not only to issues of fact, but also to mixed issues of law and
fact, and even to issues of law, at which point it can become indistinguishable from stare
decisis.").
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 comment a (1982). See also Allen
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 n.5 (1980); A, VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION 108-29
(1969).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 comment b (1982). See generally Ves-
tal & Hill, Jr., supra note 11, at 283; 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR
ARBITRATION 120-23 (1983).
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Res judicata is a fairly narrow judicial doctrine because it af-
fects only the parties and claims involved in the prior litigation. It is
concerned with claims that were or could have been addressed in the
first proceeding. This distinguishes res judicata from the concept of
collateral estoppel, which precludes claims concerning matters that
the parties actually contested in a prior proceeding. Courts are using
a more flexible definition of a "claim" and are moving away from a
"same legal rights" test or a "same facts and evidence" test toward a
"same transaction or occurrence" test.25 Using a "same transaction"
test promotes flexibility because it encourages parties to join all logi-
cally related matters in a single hearing. This test also allows an
arbitrator to conclude that a matter is suitable for separate arbitra-
tion proceedings if it arose from a different transaction.26
When an arbitrator is confronted with a grievance involving the
same claim that was raised in a prior arbitration by the identical
parties, authoritative precedential value is warranted, absent some
egregious error. There is no assurance, however, that the doctrine of
res judicata will be applied by an arbitrator in the later proceeding,
even though it is a most logical place for finding preclusion. If, of
course, the parties have submitted a dispute to an arbitrator pursu-
ant to an agreement that prior awards have no precedential effect,
application of the doctrine of res judicata would be inappropriate.
It is recognized that any call for an application of res judicata
in arbitration is contrary to a growing concern with "creeping legal-
ism" in arbitration proceedings. In some cases, however, applying ju-
dicially developed doctrines such as res judicata may save arbitrators
from their own folly.27 Arbitral case law is not offered as an example
of scientific exactness, and adherence to any principle of arbitral pre-
cedence must recognize the inexactitude and roughness of the princi-
25. See Mathews v. New York Racing Ass'n, 193 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 (1982).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). See McDonald v. City of
West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
Because federal courts are not required by statute to give res judicata or
collateral estoppel effect to an unappealed arbitration award, any rule of preclu-
sion would necessarily be judicially fashioned . . . . On two previous occasions
this Court has considered the contention that an award in an arbitration pro-
ceeding brought pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement should preclude a
subsequent suit in federal court. In both instances, we rejected the claim.
Id. at 288. See also, Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects on Commercial
Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REv. 623, 641 (1988) ("The courts have long held that res judicata
applies to arbitration awards.").
27. It undermines the credibility of the arbitral process when different arbitrators inter-
pret the same contractual provision and confront similar facts but reach vastly different
results.
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pies being applied. The customary teaching among most arbitrators
today, however, is that labor arbitration is an example of a com-
pletely nonprecedential system of decision making, and such a teach-
ing needs to be balanced against the benefit of giving prior awards
authoritative precedential value in appropriate cases.
2. Collateral Estoppel.-Another potentially useful doctrine
in labor arbitration is collateral estoppel, also described as issue pre-
clusion. The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of
issues finally determined in a valid judgment, if those issues were
central to the determination of a dispute. 8 According to the doc-
trine, the issue in contention must actually be in dispute and must
actually be decided, even if the prior action between the parties in-
volved a different formal complaint. 29 Additionally, the doctrine gen-
erally requires the issue to be of importance to the parties and neces-
sary to any decision or award.
The main concern with collateral estoppel is whether the parties
had an adequate opportunity to submit thorough arguments about
the issue in the first proceeding. Collateral estoppel differs from res
judicata because collateral estoppel might operate in favor of but not
against3" strangers to the first proceeding in certain circumstances.
Therefore, it must be established that the party against whom the
doctrine applied had a full opportunity to present relevant
evidence-3
Arbitrators should consider applying the doctrine of collateral
estoppel when faced with a claim involving an identical issue that
was actually in dispute in a prior hearing, actually decided, and es-
sential to a prior award involving the same parties. Arbitrators must
ascertain whether the parties had an adequate incentive to present
evidence concerning the issue in the earlier proceeding. It is reasona-
ble to conclude that if a particular issue has already been addressed
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). See generally Vestal & Hill,
Jr., supra note 11, at 283. See also Mobilia, Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel Arising Out
of Nonjudicial Proceedings, 50 ALB. L. REv. 305 (1986).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment j (1982) ("The appropriate
question, then, is whether the issue was actually recognized by the parties as important and by
the trier as necessary to the first judgment."). See also F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note
2, at 422.
30. Jackson Pub. Schools, 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 315 (1976). In that case, employees
individually arbitrated a dispute, and the union was not a party to the first action. Hence, it
could not be collaterally estopped in a subsequent action by the prior award.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982). See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). See also Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of 111.
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Zenith Radio v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 110
(1969).
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in a prior proceeding involving the same parties, that issue cannot be
raised in a subsequent hearing.32 This outcome promotes the effi-
ciency of the dispute resolution system by avoiding the waste of re-
sources that naturally accompanies the relitigation of particular
issues.
Despite the usefulness of common law precedential doctrines,
arbitrators should not view the doctrines as rigid directives. Equita-
ble considerations affect the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, and their application is discretionary. The use of a claim,
as contrasted with a cause of action, as the minimum permissible
unit of litigation in modern civil practice makes these doctrines more
flexible, 4 and as a result, arbitrators should incorporate the benefits
of this flexibility into arbitral decision making.
When an arbitrator confronts a new party who attempts to as-
sert collateral estoppel against a party to a prior arbitration award,
the award should receive less precedential value. Authoritative prec-
edential value is warranted, however, if the new party uses a previ-
ously decided issue to defend a claim by a party that had full incen-
tive to arbitrate the issue in the earlier proceeding.35 On the other
hand, if the new party attempts to assert collateral estoppel offen-
sively, the arbitrator must weigh the incentive of the first party in
the prior arbitration action against the possible negative conse-
32. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
33. Note, Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel Effect of a Court Determination in Subse-
quent Arbitration, 45 ALB. L. REV. 1029, 1037 (1981) ("When considering whether res judi-
cata or collateral estoppel should be applied in a given situation, courts have recognized the
need for flexibility. Notwithstanding the general view that society is best served by having an
end to litigation, the doctrines have been equitably applied."). See also CARDOZO, ADHERENCE
TO PRECEDENT, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 151 (1921), stating:
There should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position when the
rule to be discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have determined the
conduct of the litigants, and particularly when in its origin it was the product of
institutions or conditions which have gained a new significance or development
with the progress of the years.
See also K.M. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 72 (1930), stating:
Return first to what I may call the orthodox doctrine of precedent . . . . Every
case lays down a rule, the rule of the case. The express ratio decidendi is prima
facie the rule of the case, since it is the ground upon which the court chooses to
rest its decision. But a later court can reexamine the case and can invoke the
canon that no judge has the power to decide what is not before him, and,
through examination of the facts or of the procedural issue, narrow the picture
of what was actually before the court and can hold that the ruling may require
to be understood as thus restricted. In the extreme form this results in what is
known as expressly "binding the case to its paiticular facts."
34. Holland, Modernizing Res Judicata: Reflections on the Parklane Doctrine, 55 IND.
L.J. 615, 615 (1980). The mutuality rule in collateral estoppel situations also encourages flexi-
bility. Id. at 615-16.
35. See generally Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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quences of allowing the nonparty to consider the decision in the first
action before filing a grievance. 6 If the issue was fully presented in
the first arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator should give highly per-
suasive value to the prior award. If, however, there is a substantial
probability that using such precedent will likely cause a surge of new
claims, less precedential value is merited."
3. Stare Decisis.-The concept of stare decisis ("let the deci-
sion stand") is both subtle and complex. The principle is premised on
the idea that once a rule is developed, it should be followed in simi-
lar situations. Arbitrators generally do not recognize a need to follow
decisions by their colleagues, and routinely maintain that stare deci-
sis has no role in arbitration."8 As one scholar observed: "In contrast
36. Id.
37. Id. See also Kroeger v. United States Postal Serv., 865 F.2d 235 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(The court gave preclusive effect to an arbitration award and applied a "fairness" test, stating
that "[u]nfairness sufficient to bar application of collateral estoppel requires a specific showing
that the precise dispute was not fairly litigated and resolved before the arbitrator."); HILL, JR.
& SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 395 (2d ed. 1987), stating:
An arbitrator should ordinarily apply concepts of res judicata preclusion and not
allow a party to relitigate an issue or claim that was the subject of prior arbitra-
tion. The need for finality and consistency, as well as the need to maintain the
integrity of the grievance and arbitration mechanisms, mandate this result, even
though the second arbitrator might have ruled differently. Arbitrators have de-
clared that adherence to prior awards is desirable in order to maintain stable
labor relations, to insure finality to the grievance resolution mechanism, and to
prevent harassment by either party. In addition, policy reasons for adhering to
the concept of res judicata are consistent with federal labor policy.
38. See Howan, supra, note 15, at 64. See also Harris, The Use of Precedent in Labor
Arbitration, 32 ARB. J. 26, 26 (1977) ("As virtually everyone who participates in the arbitra-
tion process knows, the arbitrator is not bound by the 'precedent' of decisions by other arbitra-
tors for other parties however similar the facts or contract language seem to be."). D. Feller,
Relationship of the Agreement to External Law, in LABOR ARBITRATOR DEVELOPMENT 44
(Barreca, Miller & Zimny ed. 1983) stated:
It is standard learning in the field of arbitration that each collective bargaining
agreement is a fundamental law or constitution unto itself. No decision by an-
other arbitrator under another collective bargaining agreement, even if the
words are identical to the different agreements, is precedent in the lawyer's sense
All an award settles is that grievance. It does not manifest an intention on the
part of the parties that the arbitration award in a contract interpretation case is
final and binding on that question for the term of the contract.
See also Howard, Informing the Arbitrator, 10 VAND. L. REV. 771 (1957).
[C]itation and use of other arbitration decisions may be regarded as helpful.
They will only be so, however, if it is kept in mind that such so-called precedents
are not actually precedents in the full sense in which lawyers and judges com-
monly use the term, that they have no binding effect, and that other possible
differences in the agreements under which they are rendered, and differences in
backgrounds and practices may have been important factors in the determina-
tion of such cases.
Id. at 785.
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to the judicial doctrine of stare decisis, an arbitrator's interpretation
of the contractual relation is not technically binding on a future
arbitrator." 9
Arbitration decisions involving new parties, new claims, and
new industries deserve less persuasive value. Although arbitral prin-
ciples have emerged, each collective bargaining agreement stands
alone, and arbitrators are free to disregard prior awards from similar
arenas. If the parties and issues involved in a prior arbitration pro-
ceeding are closely aligned with the parties and issues in a subse-
quent proceeding, however, the prior award deserves persuasive, and
even authoritative, value.4
39. Howan, supra note 15, at 62. See also Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theo-
retical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 250 (1976) ("[ijn ordinary language,
the precedent is something done in the past that is appealed to as a reason for doing the same
thing again.").
40. Arbitrators should distinguish awards when they choose to disregard them as prece-
dent. Such an approach would help the parties to better understand the arbitrator's analysis,
as well as the current status of the language in the collective bargaining agreement. See. e.g.,
ZACK & BLOCH, LABOR AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATION AND ARBITRATION 25 (1983):
Some neutrals place great weight on prior awards, treating them, in effect, as
binding precedent in virtually all circumstances. The theory is that, in submit-
ting a matter to arbitration, the parties have agreed to seek an answer to a
question of contract interpretation. Once that answer has been rendered, it be-
comes part of the agreement and may not be re-litigated. Should the answer be
unsatisfactory, the parties must modify the agreement by negotiation. Thus,
even if the prior award is completely contrary to any approach the arbitrator
would have taken, those individuals will treat the matter as having been settled
by the parties.
Id. at 25. See also E. Schmertz, Evidentiary Considerations, in LABOR ARBITRATOR DEVEL-
OPMENT 78, 89 (Barrecca, Miller & Zimny, ed. 1983); A. Brundage, Arbitration and Public
Policy, Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitra-
tors 102, 127-28 (1963):
While no experienced practitioner in the field of arbitration would contend that
the doctrine of stare decisis is applicable in arbitrations, or that one arbitrator is
in any manner bound by any decision of another arbitrator, there are, neverthe-
less, real advantages to be gained by an arbitrator in reviewing decisions dealing
with substantially the same or related matters. To the extent that contractual
provisions are identical, there is, of course, from the point of view of labor and
management, the desirability of uniform interpretation. To the extent that par-
ticular contractual clauses may differ but the underlying issues are the same,
there is, of course, an advantage to one arbitrator in having the benefit of the
analysis and reasoning of other arbitrators.
See also S. Bernstein, Arbitration 1982, Conduct of the Hearing, Proceedings of the Thirty-
fifth Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators 68, 78 (1983):
Precedent is not a straitjacket, The metaphor used by the Supreme Court
was "a new common law," the "common law of the shop." However, the com-
mon law is not static. The greatest common .law judges are those who have grad-
ually moved and shaped the law through due regard to the past in recognition of
changing social needs and public acceptance.
See generally Sembower, Halting the Trend Towards Technicalities in Arbitration, Critical
Issues in Labor Arbitration, Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the National Acad-
emy of Arbitrators 98, 103 (1957); H. Platt, Current Criticisms of Labor Arbitration, Arbi-
tration and the Law, Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the National Academy of
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B. The Law of Judgments and Labor Arbitration
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments sets forth a pattern to
be followed for giving preclusive effect to arbitration awards. The
focus of the Restatement is on the impact of arbitration awards in
courts of law, not on one arbitrator's use of another's arbitral deci-
sion."1 The Restatement (Second) of Judgments states:
A determination of an issue in arbitration does not preclude re-
litigation of that issue if: (a) according preclusive effect to deter-
mination of the issue would be incompatible with a legal policy
or contractual provision that the tribunal in which the issue sub-
sequently arises be free to make an independent determination
of the issue in question, or with a purpose of the arbitration
agreement that the arbitration be specifically expeditious; or (b)
the procedure leading to the award lacked the elements of adju-
dicatory procedure described in section 83(2) (essential elements
of adjudication, such as adequate notice).42
Although the essence of an award must be drawn from the par-
ties' agreement, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
an arbitrator "may of course look for guidance from many sources
". and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments is a possible
Arbitrators, at XII-XIII (1959); G. Taylor, Making Arbitration Work: A Colloquium, Chal-
lenges to Arbitration, Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the National Acad-
emy of Arbitrators 101, 114 (1960); S. Garrett, Arbitration and Public Policy, Proceedings of
the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators 102, 108-10 (1961);
see Killingsworth, Twenty-five Years of Labor Arbitration-and the Future, Labor Arbitra-
tion at the Quarter Century Mark, Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Annual Meeting of the
National Academy of Arbitrators 11, 18-20 (1973); and H. Block, Decisional Thinking of
Arbitrators and Judges, Proceedings of the Thirty-third Annual Meeting of the National
Academy of Arbitrators 119, 142-44, 183 (1981).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (1982). See also 0. FAIRWEATHER,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION (1973).
Thus, while the strict classical formulations of res judicata, that is, that parties
should be bound by prior determinations to avoid repetitive litigation may be
somewhat out of place in the less formalistic process of industrial arbitration,
there is adequate evidence that arbitrators using various guises have permitted
ideas basic to that doctrine to survive . ...
Id. at 342. Also, "[c]ollateral estoppel is a doctrine which is as appropriate in arbitration as it
is in the court." Id. at 262. See also Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Local 420, 718 F.2d
14, 20 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Principles of stare decisis and res judicata do not have the same
doctrinal force in arbitration . . . as they do in judicial proceedings . . . and, while it is the
usual practice of arbitrators to find prior awards final and binding, . . . subsequent arbitrators
may set aside or modify a previous award in certain circumstances.").
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (1982). See also United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); General Tel. Co. of Ohio, 70
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 240, 241 (1978) (Section 4.11 of the parties' agreement stated: "[T]he
decision of the arbitrators shall be final and binding upon the parties. ... ).
43. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960). See also infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
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source. It is clear that if the losing party in a grievance arbitration
seeks rearbitration of the identical claim involving the same griev-
ance, the "finality" clause of the parties' collective bargaining agree-
ment precludes such a claim."" Such clauses reflect the customary
agreement of the parties to make an arbitrator's decision the final
word in contractual disputes. The term res judicata, however, is
sometimes used less precisely in arbitration awards when the workers
and claims are different. 5 It is more realistic to expect arbitrators to
apply the doctrine of res judicata when the employer, union, and
labor contract are the same.46 Just as the collective bargaining
agreement is "more than a contract," governing a "myriad of cases
which the draftsman cannot wholly anticipate, ' 47 there should not be
a formalistic or rigid application of the law of judgments without
modifying it to address the unique realities of the workplace, 48 the
policies favoring labor arbitration, 9 the legitimate expectations of
44. See Atlantic Richfield Co., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 764, 767-68 (1982); Hygrade Food
Prods. Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 755, 757 (1979); Detroit Edison Co., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
565, 569 (1979); Board of Educ. of Cook County, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 310, 314 (1979);
Town of West Orange, N.J., 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 581, 583 (1977) (Arbitrator Dennis offered
a useful distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel); General Tel. Co. of Ohio, 70
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 240, 243-45 (1978).
45. See Atlantic Richfield Co., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 764, 767-68 (1982); Armstrong
World Indus., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 720, 721-22 (1980) (the arbitrator did not cite the doc-
trine of res judicata, but a prior award construing the management rights clause was found to
be binding); Detroit Edison Co, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 565, 569 (1979); Board of Educ. of Cook
County, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 310, 314 (1979); General Tel. Co. of Ohio, 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
240, 243-45 (1978).
46. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960). Courts may not necessarily apply standard common-law principles of contract law to
collective bargaining agreements. See Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1958); Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MICH.
L. REV. 635 (1959); Summers, Collective Agreements Under the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE
L.J. 525 (1969).
47. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960). Elkouri and Elkouri observed that
precedent, the Siamese twin of substantive principles, is totally out of place in
some arbitration cases. In other cases, only a little use of precedent is justified.
In a sense, each collective bargaining relationship is a world of its own-a world
which may be given features of infinite variety under the virtually unlimited
right of contract enjoyed by Americans. The phrase "each case must be decided
on its own" does have a definite place in arbitration.
F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra, note 2, at 433. See also Simmons, Arbitral Stare Decisis:
An Unheralded but Important Doctrine in Canadian Arbitral Jurisprudence, II QUEEN'S L.J.
347 (1986).
48. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581-82. See also 29 U.S.C. § 173(b) (1976) ("Final
adjustment by the method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method
for settling grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing col-
lective bargaining agreement,").
49. Detroit Edison Co., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 565, 568-69 (1979); General Tel. Co. of
Ohio, 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 240, 244 (1978); Todd Shipyards, 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 27, 28
(1977). See also Seitz, supra note 1, at 59 ("When parties choose an arbitrator, they contract
to be bound, not by decisions of courts or other arbitrators in somewhat comparable matters,
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the parties,50 and the nature of any prior proceeding to which a
party has ascribed preclusive force.51
The parties should understand the impact of an arbitrator's de-
cision, particularly its binding effect on the relationship between the
parties. This raises an ethical dimension to the disinclination of most
arbitrators to be bound by relevant prior awards. Although the Code
of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management
Disputes52 addresses the topic of arbitral precedent, it leaves the
matter unresolved. The Code of Professional Responsibility allows
arbitrators to make individual determinations as to whether they will
rely on prior arbitration a~vards, unless the parties have reached an
explicit agreement about the matter.5"
Few collective bargaining agreements address the role of arbi-
tral precedent. Moreover, gome arbitrators oppose giving any prece-
dential value to arbitration awards, and instead, believe that prior
decisions should only be cited as evidence that another arbitrator has
reached the same conclusion.5" Since the Code of Professional Re-
but by his or her own judgment as to how the case should be decided on the facts in the record
and the argument advanced.").
50. Vestal & Hill, Jr., supra note 11, at 303-04. See also F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI,
How ARBITRATION WORKS 428 (3rd ed. 1973).
51. See, e.g., Drummond Co., Inc. & United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 20, Local
Union 1881, 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 3633, 3638 (1986) (an arbitrator refused to fol-
low a prior award due to an earlier arbitrator's bad judgment); General Shale Prods. Corp., 60
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 387, 390 (1973) (an arbitrator refused to follow an award due to the prior
arbitrator's unsound reasoning); Braniff Airways, Inc. & Int'l Airline Pilots Ass'n, 70-1 Lab.
Arb. Awards (CCH) 3701, 3707 (1969) (an arbitrator refused to follow an award due to the
absence of a reasoned opinion in the earlier decision); Henry Vogt Mach. Co. & United Steel-
workers of Am., Local 1693, 68-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 5263, 5269 (1968) (an arbitrator
refused to follow an award because of material changes in the language of the collective bar-
gaining agreement); International Paper Co., 60 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 447, 451 (1973) (an arbi-
trator refused to follow an award because of faulty reasoning and clear error in the prior
decision).
52. The Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Dis-
putes can be found in ROTHSCHILD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING & LABOR ARBITRATION 247-62
(2d ed. 1979).
53. Section HI(G) of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators in Labor-
Management Disputes states:
An arbitrator must assume full responsibi.lity for the decision in each case
decided.
(a) The extent, if any, to which an arbitrator properly may rely on prece-
dent, and guidance of other awards ...is dependent primarily on the
policy of the parties on these matters, or as expressed in the contract, or
other agreement, or at the hearing.
(b) When the mutual desires of the parties are not known or when the
parties express differing opinions or policies, the arbitrator may exercise
discretion as to these matters, consistent with acceptance of full personal
responsibility for the award.
For a copy of the Code, see ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE, 225-32 (A. Zack ed. 1984).
54. See Seitz, The Citation of Authority on Precedent and Arbitration (Its Use and
Abuse), 38 ARB. J. 58 (1983).
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sponsibility requires arbitrators to be clear about their assumption of
full responsibility for the decision in a case, arbitrators should think
in terms of the precedential value of an award rather than sug-
gesting that authoritative force has been ascribed to a prior award.55
C. Precedential Value: Binding or Persuasive?
It is customary for collective bargaining agreements to contain a
contractual provision, known as a finality clause, in which the parties
agree that an arbitrator's decision shall be final and binding.56 These
clauses have been cited as authority for giving binding precedential
value to prior arbitration awards.57 The United States Supreme
The citation of a decision by an unproven, unknown, or little known arbitrator is
not likely to impress or persuade an arbitrator studying the brief any more than
a citation of a ruling of the municipal code of Topeka, Kansas (to reach for a
hypothetical illustration) would be accepted as the foundation stone of a decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia! Even assum-
ing, arguendo, that arbitrators should take notice of what others have said and
concluded in comparable cases, arbitrators who perceive that they have been
chosen to serve because of their judgment on the problem presented are not
likely to be swayed in exercising that judgment by what was said or decided by
an unproven arbitrator, new in the field, whose acceptability in the profession is
yet to be established and demonstrated.
Id. at 60.
55. Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators in Labor-Management Disputes,
§ II(G) reprinted in ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE 232 (A. Zack ed. 1984). See also Mark
Twain Indus., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 441, 449 (1979) (an arbitrator declined to consult with or
review the award of another arbitrator in a relevant case because of an arbitrator's duty to be
responsible for his or her own award).
The term "precedential value of an award" seems better suited for a discussion of princi-
ples of preclusion as applied in arbitration to distinguish references to the authoritative or
persuasive force of judicial decisions in a discussion of the law of judgments. See, e.g., United
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Honeywell, Inc., 522 F.2d 1221, 1228 (7th Cir. 1975)
("Notions of res judicata are less suited to the informal process of industrial arbitration than
to the litigation process, and to the extent that res judicata has been used in arbitration, a
strict factual identity has been required."); Fensinger, Collective Bargaining, Labor Arbitra-
tion and the Lawyer, 10 VAND. L. REV. 761, 769 (1957) ("Arbitration, then, is not the prac-
tice of law, but the practice of adjusting labor-management disputes within the framework of
collective bargaining."); Alleyne, Delawyerizing Labor Arbitration, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 95
(1989) ("Today, except for the absence of a high bench, oak-panelled walls, and an enrobed
judge, a casual and short-term observer may fail to distinguish between a one-day labor arbi-
tration contesting a one-day suspension from work and the trial of an antitrust case in federal
district court."). Professor Alleyne also described labor arbitration as "an abused victim of
incremental formalism." Id. at 106.
56. See generally Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); see also GRIEV-
ANCE PROCEDURES, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION 510, 513 (Roths-
child, Merrifield & Craver, 3d ed. 1988) ("After such hearing the arbitrator shall promptly
render a decision which shall be binding upon both parties .... "). Cf. Weisberger, Examples
of Language and Interpretation in Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements (New
York State School of Industrial & Labor Relations, 194) ("If the grievance is not resolved as
a result of this meeting (with the agreed employee), his association representative, the chair-
man of the board of supervisors, or other representatives of the employer, the grievance may
be submitted to the courts.").
57. Compare General Tel. Co. of Ohio, 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 240, 244-45 (1978) (an
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Court recognized that arbitrators may evaluate other arbitration
awards as part of the decision making process. The Court observed
that "[t]he labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the
express provisions of the contract, as the industrial common
law-the practices of the industry and the shop-is equally a part of
the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in it."58
An awareness of "practices of the industry" comes in part from
studying the awards of other arbitrators, and it is reasonable to con-
clude that the Court has recognized that arbitrators, in fact, consider
other arbitration decisions for general direction and guidance in the
decision making process."
When arbitrators choose how and when to give precedential
value to prior awards, they wield a powerful tool for crafting a rem-
edy in a given case. Many interests, including justice, industry ex-
pectations, and finality can be served by a single arbitration decision.
Therefore, arbitrators must consider the historical development of a
particular industry or a labor-management relationship to make a
fully informed decision.6" Since arbitration awards, like judicial de-
arbitrator rendered an award for a company denying a grievance submitted by one part of the
bargaining unit as final and binding on the entire unit because, in part, of the finality clause)
with Dresser Indus., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 138, 142 (1979) (an expedited award had no prece-
dential value and, while binding on the grievants, was not binding on others). See also B.
Fischer, Arbitration of Interest Disputes, Proceedings of the Twenty-sixth Annual Meeting of
the National Academy of Arbitrators 62, 68 (1974).
58. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-
82 (1960). See also Ottley v. Sheepshead Nursing Home, 688 F.2d 883, 889 (2d Cir. 1982)
(the court upheld an arbitrator's award even though it was based on a provision of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act rather than on the collective bargaining agreement. The court
stated, "Rapid, binding decisions promote industrial peace and create a system of industrial
self-government . . . .If . . .we confine the arbitrator to mechanically interpreting contracts
in a vacuum, we critically hinder his ability to achieve these goals.").
59. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 414; see also National Lead Co., 28
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 470, 474-77 (1957) (the arbitrators used prior awards to develop general
principles which they then applied to this specific situation). In support of this approach, see
Abrams, supra note 5. For a contrary view, see Seitz, supra note 1, at 60. Seitz's view of citing
precedent as "binding authority" in arbitration hearings is that it is "misleading and repre-
sents a basic misunderstanding of arbitration as a system of industrial jurisprudence." Id.
Seitz's major complaints are that (I) the overwhelming number of arbitration decisions pub-
lished in the recent past are by relative unknowns who have yet to earn a professional reputa-
tion; (2) many decisions issued by highly respected, skilled, and insightful arbitrators are never
published; and (3) the increased cost in time and effort of research undermines two of arbitra-
tion's principal objectives: speed and economy in resolving disputes.
60. See K.M. LLEWELLYN, supra note 33, at 56-69 (an excellent account of the flexible
use of precedent by judges and lawyers). See also Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in
Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L, REV. 999 (1955).
When the parties submit to arbitration in the system of which I speak, they seek
not merely resolution of the particular stalemate, but guidance for the future, at
least for similar cases. They could hardly have a high opinion of the arbitrator's
mind if it were a constantly changing mind. Adherence to prior decisions, except
when departure is adequately explained, is one sign that the determinations are
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terminations, can be followed, distinguished, or ignored, rational ar-
bitrators will make present day decisions with an understanding of
past experiences. 61
Arbitrators frequently confront the issue of arbitral precedent,
and an examination of arbitration awards demonstrates the method
often used by arbitrators to distinguish between awards accorded
substantial precedential value and more ephemeral decisions. First,
attention will be focused on proceedings in which only one of the
parties seeks to have an arbitrator reconsider a prior award. An ex-
amination of a prior award construing the same collective bargaining
agreement will follow.
1. Arbitrators Should Give Binding Precedential Value to
Awards for Which One Party Requests Reconsideration.-Oc-
casionally parties to a prior proceeding will ask a subsequent arbitra-
tor to reconsider the earlier decision. The subsequent arbitrator must
then determine the weight to be given the prior award. In such cir-
cumstances, subsequent arbitrators serve as an appellate tribunal or
reviewing arbitrator. If the reviewing arbitrator finds that the first
arbitrator analyzed the dispute incorrectly or that new evidence un-
available at the first hearing has been discovered, the subsequent ar-
bitrator may declare the matter to be procedurally arbitrable and
then hear the dispute on its merits.6" If it is demonstrated that a full
and fair initial hearing took place, however, the arbitrator should
deny the petition for reconsideration and declare the matter resolved
pursuant to the prior award.
Several cases have addressed the review process for arbitration
awards. For example, in Expedient Services, Inc., 8 the arbitrator
concluded that he was without authority to review his own prior
award without agreement from both parties. The prior award di-
based on reason and are not merely random judgments.
Id. at 1020.
61. See Merrill, A Labor Arbitrator Views His Work, 10 VAND. L. REV. 789, 797
(1957) ("Certainly, an arbitrator may be aided in formulating his own conclusions by knowl-
edge of how other men have solved similar problems. He ought not to arrogate as his own
special virtues the wisdom and justice essential to sound decision."). Over three decades ago,
Professor Merrill believed that a concern with "creeping legalism" in arbitration reflected "a
strange and unrealistic attitude." Id. Cf. Dresser Indus., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 138, 140 (1979)
(a collective bargaining agreement required that precedential value not be accorded expedited
arbitration awards).
62. See S. Bernstein, Arbitration 1982, Conduct of the Hearing, Proceedings of the
Thirty-fifth Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators, 68, 77-78 (1983); see also
Howan, supra, note 15, at 64.
63. 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1082 (1977). See also Pacific Mills, 3 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 144,
145 (1946); Waterfront Employers Ass'n of Pacific Coast, 7 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 757 (1947).
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rected the employer to return a grievant to work with his seniority
unimpaired. 64 The employer did not return the grievant to the same
shop where he had been assigned to perform his duties as a union
steward. 5 The arbitrator refused to clarify the award, claiming that
he lacked authority pursuant to the common law doctrine of functus
officio.66
Similarly, in John Deere Co., 7 the arbitrator barred a subse-
quent proceeding based on the original grievance. In that case, a
union successfully grie, ed an employer's assignment of a bid for a
job based on seniority.18 After the union prevailed in arbitration, it
sought back pay for the grievant. 9 The arbitrator ruled that "the
plaintiff is required, however, to include in a single action all
breaches .... ,,70 According to the arbitrator, the grievant had re-
ceived the remedy sought and should be permitted to receive no
other remedy, such as back pay, once an award had been rendered.
71
In effect, the arbitrator declared the matter to be res judicata; that
is, all parts of the original claim merged into the final award, and
the parties were estopped from relitigating a part of the dispute at a
later date.
In Kohn Beverage Co., 7 1 an arbitrator denied a company's mo-
tion to reconsider an award based on new evidence concerning the
veracity of a witness.73 The arbitrator premised his ruling on a na-
tional policy favoring finality as an "essential characteristic of the
64. Expedient Servs., Inc. 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1082, 1083 (1977).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1084. The common law doctrine of functus officio in the arbitration context
means that arbitrators' duties are terminated when they render their decisions. The doctrine
has been modified in § 9 of the Uniform Arbitration Act so that an arbitrator can modify or
correct an award on one party's petition, as long as the merits of the decision are not dis-
turbed. Litton, Judicial Review and Enforcement of the Arbitration Award, TRIAL, March
1980, at 23. Some arbitrators retain jurisdiction in a case for the limited purpose of adminis-
tering a remedy.
67. 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 997 (1978).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 998.
71. Id.
72. 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1156 (1982).
73. Id. at 1157. Compare Waterfront Employees Ass'n of Pacific Coast, 7 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 757, 757 (1947) (A party requesting a rehearing . . . bears the burden of proof that
his request is justified on such grounds as (I) new substantial evidence not available when the
case was heard, (2) lack of clarity, legal bars, or other reasons making the award impossible of
execution, (3) obvious and substantial errors of fact or law, or (4) lack of a fair and full
hearing.). See generally 0. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 24, at 120-21 ("Where the grievance is
merely a refining of a grievance that was settled previously, arbitrators hold that the second
grievance is not arbitrable even where 'both the Union and Company testimony, and docu-
ments available at the hearing, support the Grievant's claim.' ").
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arbitration system created by the parties. '74 Citing Expedient Ser-
vices, Inc.,75 the arbitrator in Kohn Beverage Co. concluded that he
had "fulfilled the obligations of his office and relinquished all power
to issue awards binding on the parties" by rendering an earlier
award.7 In effect, the arbitrator held that the matter was res
judicata.
Giving binding precedential value to a prior arbitration award
when one party seeks to have the same or a subsequent arbitrator
reconsider it is sensible. Once a dispute has been heard on its merits
and the decision rendered, the final conclusion should not be dis-
turbed unless a party was denied the opportunity to make a full pres-
entation during the initial proceeding. Even if philosophical views
concerning the role of precedent in arbitration differ, arbitrators
should adopt efficiency as a goal in dealing with these situations. Ab-
sent some dominant institutional principle, economic efficiency and a
concern with conserving resources compel arbitrators to reject at-
tempts to gain reconsideration of a decided matter.
2. Arbitrators Should Give Binding Precedential Value to
Prior Awards Construing the Same Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment.-Reliance on arbitral precedents provides benefits to the par-
ties to a collective bargaining agreement, quite apart from the arbi-
tration context. Each party benefits from having similar cases
decided in a consistent manner. The stability that results from fol-
lowing precedents fosters rationality in the relationship between the
parties. Rational consistency reduces conflict and allows the parties
to channel their energies into the actual mission of the enterprise, as
opposed to bickering about the most appropriate resolution of a par-
ticular grievance. The parties themselves have an institutional inter-
est in establishing and following precedent in decisions affecting the
parties in that they are able to plan their conduct more efficiently.
Many of these same benefits arise when an arbitrator considers
decisions rendered by other arbitrators under the same collective
bargaining agreement. The parties have a right to expect a subse-
quent arbitrator to be bound by prior interpretations of that agree-
ment, absent some fundamental flaw in the earlier proceeding. In
Todd Shipyards,77 Arbitrator Edgar Jones, a former president of the
74. Kohn Beverage Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1156, 1157 (1982).
75. 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1082 (1977).
76. Kohn, 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1157.
77. 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 27 (1977). See also Jones, Talk of the Town, The Chronicle,
Oct. 1988, at 2 (a humorous article for the newspaper of the National Academy of Arbitra-
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National Academy of Arbitrators, observed that "once an arbitral
award has been issued interpreting the existent language of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the gist of that interpretation becomes
the applicable meaning to be administered thenceforth by the par-
ties, at least during the unexpired term of that incarnation of the
parties' collective bargaining agreement. ' 8 Professor Jones reasoned
that arbitration awards would no longer be viewed as final and bind-
ing if arbitrators felt free to reevaluate prior decisions and substitute
their own judgment for that of the previous arbitrator when evaluat-
ing the same language of the agreement between the parties.7 9
The grievance in Todd Shipyards concerned pay rates for work
performed on a vessel anchored in an area known as a "powder
anchorage," meaning that it was reserved for ships carrying explo-
sives.80 The vessel in question did not carry explosives and was
merely too large to dock at the employer's pier.8 1 The employer,
therefore, paid workers at the regular rate of pay, as opposed to a
tors). Professor Jones stated:
Weasels may turn white, lions stalk, chameleons blend. But for arbitrasori:
"weight of authority?" How can one weigh that which does not exist? Does not
conventional wisdom, not to say legal principles, counsel that there is no such
thing as "authority" whereby one arbitrator is constrained to bow to the judg-
ment of others?
Is this chameleonic invocation [weight of authority] perhaps a symptom of
some insidious development; a faint harbinger of an erosion of self-confidence; a
loss of courage of convictions; a possible hint of an impending diminishment of
the assumption that a uniqueness of competence and utility possessed by labor
arbitrators?
Id. at 2. Cf. NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 157 (1975) (the court referred to "a well
established current of arbitral authority").
78. Todd Shipyards, 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 27, 29 (1977). See also Hobet Mining, Inc.
& Local 5817, Dist. 17, United Mine Workers of Am., 88-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 4948
(1988) (an arbitrator dismissed the grievance because there had been a prior decision under
the same agreement between the same parties that had raised the same issue, and the arbitra-
tor (1) could find no bad judgment in the prior award; (2) found the earlier decision to have
been made on the basis of all critical facts; (3) saw no obvious errors of fact or law in the
previous case; and (4) found that a full and fair hearing had been afforded in the prior case.
Even though the arbitrator in the subsequent case "might not have reached the same result"
that had been reached in the earlier case, binding precedential value was given to the earlier
decision.).
79. 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 27, 28 (1977). See also Sears & Roebuck Co., Inc. 39 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 567 (1962); ZACK & BLOCH, LABOR AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATION AND ARBI-
TRATION 25 (1983); 0 & S Bearing Co., 12 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 132, 135-36 (1949).
This has found support among some legal commentators. See Abrams, supra note 5, at
569 ("The arbitrator must go about his decisional duties, therefore, in a way which encourages
the losing party to accept the issued awards as final. A decision-making system based on pre-
existing standards as opposed to ad hoc rationales or idiosyncratic values has increased legiti-
macy."). See generally Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 999 (1955); Note, Case Law or "Free Decision" in Grievance Arbitration, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 118 (1948).
80. Todd Shipyards, 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 27, 28 (1977).
8 I. ld.
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premium rate.82 In an earlier arbitration award involving a nonex-
plosive ship in the "powder anchorage," a different arbitrator held
that premium pay was not to be given simply because work had been
performed at the "powder anchorage.""3 Arbitrator Jones rejected
the union's "late attack" on the prior award and concluded that the
earlier arbitration decision had been "melded into the substance of
the parties' agreement" to such an extent "that it would amount to a
contractually proscribed alteration, change or modification were the
earlier award not applied intact. '8 4 Clearly, Professor Jones recog-
nized and applied the precedential authority inherent in the prior
decision.
In Todd Shipyards, all members of the bargaining unit were
parties to the first arbitration proceeding.8 5 When a party to the ini-
tial proceeding attempted to collaterally attack the prior award by
arbitrating the identical issue, the arbitrator refused to upset the
earlier award. Even though the subsequent dispute involved a differ-
ent transaction and different employees, the previous ruling was
binding. Possibly, the application of such a technical rule in arbitra-
tion represents "creeping legalism," but the result in the case served
the best interests of the parties.
The assignment of precedential value to a prior award was the
subject of General Telephone Co. of Ohio.8" In the initial decision,
an arbitrator focused on the bargaining unit as a whole, as opposed
to looking at members of a particular crew in the unit.87 An award
was rendered in favor of the employer. 8 Less than a month after the
initial award, the union filed a grievance on behalf of the entire bar-
gaining unit, alleging the same breach of contract. The second arbi-




85. Todd Shipyards, 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 27, 28 (1977).
86. 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 240 (1978). See also H. Block, Decisional Thinking of Arbi-
trators and Judges, Proceedings of the Thirty-third Annual Meeting of the National Academy
of Arbitrators 119, 143 (1981) ("Even though an arbitrator is not bound by a prior decision
based upon an interpretation of the identical contract provision between the same parties, he
will generally follow the prior decision to assure stability and finality to the collective bargain-
ing relationship.").
Cf. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, Local 97-B v. Haddon Craftsmen, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1088
(M.D. Pa. 1979) (two arbitrators in different arbitration proceedings interpreted the same
contractual provision differently, and the court refused to set aside either award).
87. General Tel. Co. of Ohio, 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 240, 242 (1978) (citing American
Arbitration Ass'n Case No. 54-30-227-76 (1977)).
88. Id. at 242.
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prior award foreclosed the issues. 9 Without referring to the concept
of collateral estoppel, the subsequent arbitrator relied on the "final
and binding" clause in the parties' collective bargaining agreement
as the basis for the decision.9" He believed that "the arbitration pro-
cess ill serves the parties' mutual needs if awards are disregarded
because they are unpalatable or because the losing party thinks that
another arbitrator might take a more sympathetic view."91
Arbitrator Marvin Hill addressed the scope of binding prece-
dential value in Board of Education of Cook County.92 He con-
cluded that "when a prior arbitrator has rendered an award in a
dispute between the same employer and the same union, the prece-
dential effect of the prior award tends to move from that of stare
decisis to that of res judicata." '93 In Board of Education of Cook
County, a prior arbitration proceeding had already determined the
issue of compensation for cooperative education teachers who had a
larger number of pupils than the average range set forth in the par-
ties' collective bargaining agreement.9 ' The union attempted to dis-
tinguish the prior arbitration decision on the ground that it involved
a separate transaction and occurrence, but Professor Hill rejected
the argument. He stated that "a subsequent arbitrator should treat
the award as if it were a written stipulation by the parties setting
forth their own definite construction of the labor contract. The
award is therefore binding until the parties themselves amend the
language of the agreement."95
In his decision, Professor Hill distinguished stare decisis and res
judicata;98 stare decisis allows the same rule of law to be applied
against new parties and new claims, and res judicata estops identical
parties from litigating all or part of an old claim. 7 He also described
collateral estoppel as the middle ground that estops identical parties
or their privies from pursuing an old issue by raising a new claim."
This is precisely the role collateral estoppel should play in the labor-
89. Id. at 245.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 244.
92. 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 310 (1979).
93. Id. at 314.
94. Id. at 311. See also Vestal & Hill, Jr., supra note 11, at 342. See also 0. FAIR-
WEATHER, supra note 24, at 335-46.
95. Id. at 315 n.8. Vestal & Hill, Jr., supra note 11, at 315; ZACH & BLOCH, supra note
79, at 25 (an arbitration award becomes a contractual term of the parties' collective bargain-
ing agreement). See also Abrams, supra note 5; Shulman, supra note 60. Cf. Jennings &
Martin, supra note 1; McPherson, supra note I; Dworkin, supra note 1.
96. 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 314.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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management context when parties have agreed that an arbitration
award will be final and binding.
3. The Benefits of Precedential Value in Arbitration.-Just as
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments codifies a plaintiff's right to
a day in court and generally precludes consideration of claims and
issues that could or should have arisen in the prior hearing, 99 the
participants in a labor-management arbitration proceeding would
benefit from being able to rely on a similar principle. Recognition of
a comparable principle in arbitration would promote efficiency and
enable parties to allocate their resources economically. It would also
promote justice by preventing one party from using a failed transac-
tion as a tool of harassment. The objective is not to "freeze" the
parties in time but, rather, to provide the parties with clearer guide-
lines for conducting their business. In addition, if employees believe
that the system of dispute resolution treats all participants in a simi-
lar manner, a sense of justice is encouraged.
Some arbitrators do not recognize the stabilizing effect of arbi-
tral precedent. In Ralston Purina Co.,'00 for example, an arbitrator
refused to preclude a dispute by relying on either the concept of res
judicata or collateral estoppel. In that case, eight grievants in a prior
hearing before a different arbitrator sought a higher rate of pay
when they were moved from the maintenance shop to base jobs
outside the shop. 101 The company prevailed in the first arbitration
proceeding. In a subsequent proceeding, three of the original eight
grievants asked to be allowed to "bump" junior employees in the
maintenance shop.102 The employer argued that the issue before the
arbitrator had been decided and that the first arbitrator definitively
addressed the issue involving these three grievants.' 0 '
The arbitrator'in Ralston Purina Co. disagreed with the com-
pany's position and concluded that the prior award addressed only
the narrow issue of rates of pay. 104 Accordingly, the second arbitra-
tor refused to be bound by the first decision, claiming that "bump-
ing" rights and rates of pay constituted two distinct issues. 05 He
believed that the first arbitration award did not preclude arbitration
99. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 24-26 (1982).
100. 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1163, 1166-67 (1980).
101. Id. at 1164.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1167.
105. Ralston Purina Co., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1163, 1166 (1980).
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on what he deemed to be a new issue.106
Arbitrators must understand the rules and principles applicable
to prior arbitration awards to enable them to determine when a prior
arbitration award precludes a future action. In Armstrong World In-
dustries, 1 7 an arbitrator concluded that the grievance before him
was "for all practicable purposes the same issue" as had been
presented in a prior arbitration proceeding. '0 8 The first arbitration
case concerned part-time assignments of supervisors, pursuant to a
broad management rights clause in the agreement. 9 A subsequent
grievance focused on regular maintenance duties of employees.110
The first arbitration award, however, contained dicta regarding "un-
due restrictions on the efficient operation of the plan,"'1 and this
dicta provided the analytical basis for the second arbitrator's deter-
mination that the issues in the two cases were the same.
The arbitrator in Armstrong World Industries took an extreme
position, as he permitted dicta concerning boilerplate language to de-
cide the future rights and duties between the parties. The arbitrator
found the first arbitration decision to be preclusive, even though he
relied upon language that did not represent the core of the first arbi-
trator's award. Even if a nonessential issue was discussed at the first
hearing, it is unfair to give the prior award preclusive effect with
regard to the nonessential issue when it is raised in a second hearing.
Only if an issue has been fully presented and considered by the par-
ties at the first arbitration proceeding should an arbitrator prevent a
rearbitration of the same matter in a subsequent hearing. Further-
more, a dictum in an award should establish a bar to the arbi-
trability of a grievance only when evidence about the subject matter
of the dictum has been fully presented at the first hearing. This was
an arbitrator's conclusion in Detroit Edison Co." 2 The issue in that
case concerned whether dicta in a 1977 arbitration decision nullified
a 1972 award. 1 3 In the case before the second arbitrator, the em-
ployer adopted a work rule requiring daily call-in reports." 4 This
rule was upheld in a 1972 arbitration award. In 1975, the company
106. Id. at 1166-67.
107. 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 720 (1980).
108. Id. at 721.
109. Id. ("The management of the work, the direction of the working forces and the
right to hire, suspend, or discharge for proper cause, are vested in the company subject to the
provisions of this agreement, and these rights shall not be abridged.").
110. Id. at 720.
111. Id. at 721.
112. 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 565 (1979).
113. Id. at 568.
114. Id. at 565.
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and union renegotiated the collective bargaining agreement between
them without changing the contractual provision interpreted by the
award of 1972. In 1977, another arbitration decision was issued,
which ignored the 1972 interpretation and its subsequent ratification
in 1975.1"1 In Detroit Edison Co., the employer contended that the
1972 award made the present grievance nonarbitrable. " The union,
on the other hand, maintained that dicta in the 1977 arbitration de-
cision nullified the award of 1972." 1
The arbitrator in the Detroit Edison Co. case decided in 1979
rejected the arguments of both parties.' 18 First, noting that doubts
about arbitrability should be decided in favor of arbitration, the ar-
bitrator concluded that the arbitral process should be used to deter-
mine which award controlled the present relationship between the
parties." 9 Second, the arbitrator decided that the 1975 adoption of
the parties' collective bargaining agreement, including the unaltered
clause in dispute, established the 1972 interpretation as the appropri-
ate guideline.'20 Third, the arbitrator held that the arbitrator in the
1977 case exceeded his authority when he decided the issue of
whether discharge was unjust for a violation of the daily call-in
rule. '2 Thus, the arbitrator's interpretation of the clause in 1977, as
analyzed by the arbitrator in the Detroit Edison Co. case of 1979,
was outside the scope of his arbitral duty and, as a result, it was
simply dicta.'22 The arbitrator then decided that "the first award
must stand supreme," especially since it was challenged by mere
dicta. 123
Many arbitrators fear that determining the precedential value
of arbitration awards will immerse them in a bog of antiquated co.-
cepts and principles. This fear is unfounded, however, because arbi-
trators are adept at distinguishing past issues from new ones in order
to avoid unfavorable precedential effects of prior arbitration
awards.' 24 For example, one arbitrator concluded that the "key is-
115. Id. at 566-67.
116. Id. at 567.





122. Detroit Edison Co., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 565, 568 (1979).
123. Id. at 569.
124. See generally E. BODENHEIMER, EVALUATION OF STARE DECIsIs, JURISPRUDENCE
425-30 (rev. ed. 1974) ("In the United States, stare decisis has never been considered an
inexorable command, and the duty to follow precedent has been held to be qualified by the
right to overrule prior decisions.").
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sues" in Hygrade Food Products were different from those con-
fronted in a prior award.'25 The arbitrator also stated that bad judg-
ment or changed circumstances can mandate a departure from a
prior award. 126 He then distinguished the current issue from the
prior issue and rendered an award in favor of the grievant.
12 7
To this point, the precedential value of an arbitration award has
been the focus of this Article. Questions also arise about the prece-
dential value to be given settlement agreements, however. In Neches
Butane Products, Co. 28 for example, the arbitrator was reluctant to
give preclusive effect to a prior settlement agreement. The arbitrator
believed that it was "pretty drastic to hold that a settlement of a
prior grievance controls a subsequent case."' 2  The arbitrator
avoided the problem by distinguishing the issue in the first arbitra-
tion hearing from the issue that he had to address.
30
The arbitrator's analysis in Neches Butane Products Co., in
which he concluded that a settlement agreement did not have the
effect of res judicata,' a' is consistent with the law of judgments. Al-
though parties to a collective bargaining agreement may declare that
the terms of their settlement agreement are to be viewed as final and
binding, courts generally have not been quick to find that parties
settled more than was narrowly set forth in the agreement. Appro-
priately, the arbitrator in Neches Butane Products Co. did not pre-
clude the parties from arbitrating portions of their claim that had
not been covered in their settlement agreement. This approach is
consistent with a sound public policy of encouraging settlement
agreements and an efficient resolution of disputes, while not hinder-
ing a party from later arbitrating an unresolved grievance. If a set-
tlement agreement is presented as a bar to a subsequent arbitration
proceeding, an arbitrator should be cautious about giving it preclu-
sive effect and should inquire carefully about the extent to which the
settlement agreement dealt with the merits of the case. Settlement
agreements typically embody many considerations, some not necessa-
125. Hygrade Food Prods., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 755, 757 (1979).
126. Id. See also McPherson, supra note 1, at 166-68.
127. 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 757, 759-60.
128. 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1251 (1978).
129. Id. at 1253.
130. The first grievance, involving temporary workers at an oil refinery, had been settled
without arbitration. The parties' settlement agreement, declared by the parties to be final and
binding, concerned permanent vacancies and not the appropriate use of college students as
temporary workers. The arbitrator held that this difference was sufficient to create new issues
outside the scope of preclusion of the settlement agreement. Id.
131. Id. Cf. Note, To Bind or not to Bind: Bar and Merger Treatment of Consent De-
crees in Patent Infringement Litigation, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1322 (1974).
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rily dealing with the merits of the case. At the same time, the parties
should not be permitted to settle a dispute on its merits, only to chal-
lenge the same principle in a virtually identical case at a later time.
The parties to a settlement agreement would be prudent to include a
statement of their intent with regard to the precedential value of the
agreement.
Arbitrators must also evaluate the precedential value of prior
awards when a judge directs reconsideration of a prior decision. For
instance, in Town of West Orange,"' a court remanded a decision to
an arbitrator. The court instructed the arbitrator to consider the ef-
fect of a prior award. 138 The arbitrator affirmed his original decision
and distinguished the prior arbitration award by declaring that the
prior award addressed one issue (assignments within the bargaining
unit) but that his award (covering the assignment of duties in the
unit to a police officer) was "markedly different, even though the
parties and the contract are the same.'
134
The precedential value of prior awards decreases substantially
when arbitrators are able to distinguish issues, 3 5 but since the facts
are inevitably different in every case, arbitrators can almost always
rationalize their failure to give any precedential value to a prior
award. Such an analysis may not always be in the best interest of
the parties and may undermine the rationality of interpretations of
the parties' labor contracts. Ultimately, an arbitrator is a "creature
of the parties" since the parties have the final authority to decide by
contract the precedential value to be accorded prior awards.'
D. Duration of Precedential Value
1. Prior Awards Should be Binding Only During the Term of
the Labor Contract.-In Anglo-American common law, an anti-
quated principle may control a modern day ruling. Arbitrators who
132. 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 581 (1977).
133. Id. at 582-83.
134. Id. at 584.
135. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 764, 768 (1982). See supra note 5;
Seitz, supra note I. See also Shulman, supra note 60, at 1016, stating:
The proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic. He is not a public
tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are
obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer justice for a commu-
nity which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a system of self-govern-
ment created by and confined to the parties. He serves their pleasure only, to
administer the rule of law established by their collective agreement. They are
entitled to demand that, at least on balance, his performance be satisfactory to
them, and they can readily dispense with him if he is not.
136. See J. Dunsford, Role and Function of the Labor Arbitrator, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J.
109, 112 (1985).
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are inclined to give precedential value to prior arbitration decisions
must determine the duration of a precedent within a much narrower
time period, however. Generally, this determination is made by
utilizing one of two approaches. One method makes the interpreta-
tion of the same collective bargaining provision between the same
parties binding as long as the parties do not change the provision.
1837
As a result, a particular interpretation can apply to a series of labor
agreements. The other approach concludes that the expiration of
each labor contract extinguishes the binding nature of all earlier ar-
bitration awards between the parties. 138 The prior awards may have
some persuasive value, but no more so than any other decision in the
arbitral literature.18 9
In Consolidation Coal Co.,140 a grievant arbitrarily closed a
mine, and a prior arbitration decision upheld the grievant's removal
from the Plant Safety Committee. In the subsequent arbitration pro-
ceeding, the grievant alleged that he should be permitted to stand for
re-election to the Plant Safety Committee within the year.' 1 The
employer argued that the duration of the grievant's suspension from
the committee was unspecified, or, alternatively, was to continue for
the remainder of the parties' three year collective bargaining agree-
ment. 2 The employer took the position that, "since an arbitrator's
authority is found only in the contract which expires after a given
period of years, the Company will not contend here that a decision
requiring the grievant's removal should last any longer than the term
of the contract."" 8 The arbitrator adopted this reasoning, stating
that "since the power of the arbitrator to determine related griev-
ances is established only by that same agreement, it follows logically
that none of these powers may extend beyond the life of the agree-
ment under which they are exercised."' This was an unusual deci-
sion because, as indicated below, many arbitrators do not believe
137. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 (1854), and H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v.
Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd., I All E.R. 525 (1978), which reconceptualizes the principle of
Hadley v. Baxendale. See also Pan American Refining Corp., 9 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 731, 732
(1948) ("But where, as here, the prior decision involves the interpretation of the identical
contract provision, between the same company and union, every principle of common sense,
policy, and labor relations demands that it stand until the parties annul it by a newly worded
contract provision.").
138. See Bacardi Corp. v. Congress de Uniones Industriales, 692 F.2d 210, 212 (1st Cir.
1982).
139. See Consolidation Coal Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 257, 259-60 (1978).
140. 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 257 (1978).
141. Id. at 258.
142. Id. at 259.
143. Id. at 259-60.
144. Id.
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that an interpretation of a particular provision should expire when
the parties' labor contract terminates.
2. An Award Should Have Precedential Value Until the
Agreement is Changed.-Another approach to the issue of how long
a particular arbitration award applies to the relationship between the
parties gives the award potency until the parties change the language
interpreted by the arbitrator's decision. Professor Marvin Hill ob-
served that a prior award is not only binding as a written stipulation
of the parties, but also that "the award is therefore binding until the
parties themselves amend the language of the agreement." '145 A prior
award, if the language interpreted by the award remains unchanged,
is ratified by subsequent negotiations.1"" In the Detroit Edison Co.
case, 14 7 an arbitrator determined that, after a prior award in 1972,
"the parties went into contract negotiations and readopted [the dis-
puted language] without change. Thus, it can only be concluded that
the union and the company bought [the contractual provision] as in-
terpreted" by the arbitrator in the award of 1972.148
In Todd Shipyards,1'4 the arbitrator also relied on a "readop-
tion" theory.1 0 The arbitrator concluded that an arbitration decision
"becomes the applicable meaning to be administered thenceforth by
the parties" until a collective bargaining agreement expires or until a
second arbitrator assesses the correctness of the first decision."' Pro-
fessor Jones maintained in Todd Shipyards that renegotiation of the
collective bargaining agreement without altering the language inter-
preted in the earlier arbitration decision established that award as
the interpretive rule of the parties. He stated:
So an arbitrator who is summoned to office by the parties in the
course of a subsequent term of their agreement, and is impor-
145. Board of Educ. of Cook County, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 310, 315 (1979). See also
IBEW Local 199 v. United Tel. Co. of Fla., 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2666, 2667 (M.D. Fla.
1982) (Because the first arbitrator's decision had been subsequently readopted in the current
collective bargaining agreement, the court accepted the defendant's argument that the union
had "intrinsically recognized both the binding effect of the first arbitration and of the arbitra-
tor's interpretation.").
146. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text. See also H. Block, Decisional
Thinking of Arbitrators and Judges, Proceedings of the Thirty-third Annual Meeting of the
National Academy of Arbitrators 119, 142-44 (1981).
147. 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 565 (1979).
148. Id. at 568-69. See also Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1088, 1096
(1981).
149. 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 27 (1977); see also supra notes 77-85 and accompanying
text.
150. 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 27, 28 (1977).
151. Id.
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tuned by one of them to overturn that earlier award, should feel
considerably relieved of any concern for possible error having
done violence to the intent of the parties by the earlier arbitra-
tor. The latter's award has now had the ultimate review of sub-
sequent collective bargaining negotiations and has survived the
test for whatever reason. And if, as here, at least two terms have
gone by without any alteration of it, the later arbitrator must be
doubly dubious about assertions so belatedly made of error on
the part of the first arbitrator. So much so is the earlier award
now melded into the substance of the parties' agreement that it
would amount to contractually proscribed alteration, change, or
modification were the earlier award not applied intact.'52
In another case, Armstrong World Industries,'53 the arbitrator
observed that a clause in the parties' collective bargaining agree-
ment, which had been the subject of a prior arbitration decision, re-
mained unchanged through two subsequent negotiations.' 5 ' Before
hearing closing arguments, the arbitrator informed the parties that
he would like to hear arguments concerning whether a rational basis
existed to justify a departure from the interpretation set forth in the
prior arbitration decision. 55 The second arbitrator found no valid
distinction between the circumstances presented to him and those
addressed by the first arbitration award. Accordingly, he concluded
that the prior arbitration award controlled the subsequent dispute
and rendered him unable to rule on the merits of the case. 15'
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit implicitly ap-
proved the approach set forth by the arbitrator in Armstrong World
Industries.'57 The court summarized its approach as follows:
Absent some express restriction upon the arbitrator's authority,
the arbitrator is not limited to the bare words of the agreement
and common-law rules for the interpretation of private contracts
... . An arbitrator does not violate his duty to draw the es-
sence of the award from the letter or purpose of the collective
bargaining agreement when he relies upon any of several aids
152. Id.
153. 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 720 (1980); see supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
154. 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 720, 721 (1980).
155. Id.
156. Id. See also Mead Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 391, 394 (1964); supra note 38
(reasons an arbitrator may vacate and refuse to follow a prior award).
157. Loveless v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 681 F.2d 1272, 1280 (1lth Cir. 1982).
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. . . .Aids include the past practice of the parties, . . . bar-
gaining history, ... and industrial efficiency considerations
168
A "readoption" theory should be encouraged because it fosters both
stability and certainty in labor relations when an arbitrator inter-
prets disputed language in an agreement. According to this theory, a
former arbitrator's interpretation will necessarily remain binding on
the parties when they readopt the disputed contractual provision in
subsequent negotiations. This approach gives parties a method of ob-
taining an ongoing interpretation of disputed provisions in their
agreement and makes it unnecessary for them to gamble on ob-
taining a different interpretation by changing arbitrators. The "re-
adoption" approach is also more logical because it leaves to the par-
ties the task of changing the contractual provision, and such a
legislative role more appropriately resides with the parties. "
III. The Impact of Judicial Review on an Arbitrator's Approach to
Arbitral Precedent
A. Court Action to Enforce a Prior Award in a New Dispute
1. The "Substantial Identity" Test.-With increasing fre-
158. Id.
159. See Nolan & Abrams, The Labor Arbitrator's Several Roles, 44 MD. L. REv. 873
(1985). Cf. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983). In Metropolitan Edison,
the union, despite a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement, participated in
four unlawful work stoppages between 1970 and 1974. On each occasion, the company disci-
plined the local union officials more severely than other participants. The union filed two griev-
ances over the disparate treatments, and, in both cases, the arbitrators upheld the compat.y's
actions. In 1977, the company faced a strike by an unrelated union. Members of the grievant's
union refused to cross the picket line. After resolution of the dispute, the company again disci-
plined union officials more severely than other employees for failing to attempt to end the
strike by crossing the picket line. Id. at 697.
The union filed an Unfair Labor Practice complaint against the company, and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board affirmed the administrative law judge's holding that "selected
discipline" of union officials was an unfair labor practice. The circuit court affirmed the award,
rejecting the company's argument that the two earlier arbitration awards were sufficient to
impose a contractual duty on the union. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's deci-
sion. Id. at 699. Justice Powell stated that while the union might waive a member's statutorily
protected rights, including "his right to strike during the contract term and his right to refuse
to cross a lawful picket line .... ," id. at 705, a waiver must be expressed "clearly and unmis-
takably" because the Court "will not infer from a general contractual provision that the par-
ties intended to waive a statutory protected right unless the undertaking is explicitly stated,"
id. at 708. While the union was silent during the renegotiations of the collective bargaining
agreement, with regard to the prior arbitration awards, the Supreme Court found that two
arbitration awards "did not establish a pattern of decisions clear enough to convert the union's
silence into a binding waiver." Id. at 709. The Court emphasized that the collective bargaining
agreement had a provision that an arbitrator's decision would be final and binding only for the
term of the parties' agreement. Thus, there was no showing that the parties intended to incor-
porate the two prior awards into their subsequent labor contract.
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quency, federal courts are being asked to enjoin requests for arbitra-
tion,160 to set aside awards,'161 and to enforce prior awards in new
circumstances. 162 Jurisdiction generally is based on section 301(A) of
the Labor Management Relations Act. 6 ' While some courts deter-
mined that such cases must be presented to an arbitrator to deter-
mine arbitrability, 64 others reached a different judicial conclusion.
As one author observed:
The party might then argue that, since section 301 of the
LMRA grants the court jurisdiction to enforce the prior award
and since the prior award prohibited subsequent violations, the
court might enjoin this subsequent violation. According to this
argument, the court can enjoin the subsequent violation because
the prior award is binding on this dispute. The critical issue here
is whether the court has the authority to determine the prospec-
tive effect of the prior award on the present dispute or whether
such a determination is for the arbitrator alone to make. 6'
In federal circuits that decide arbitrability issues, some have adopted
a "strict, factual identity" test' 66 or a "substantially similar" stan-
160. See Little Six Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Local 8332, 701 F.2d 26 (4th Cir.
1983). See generally Ashe, supra note 3, at 47.
161. See George Day Constr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 722 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir.
1984); Teamsters Union Local No. 115 v. DeSoto, Inc., 725 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1984); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Timken Co., 717 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1983); Connecticut Light &
Power Co. v. Local 420, 718 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1983); Bacardi Corp. v. Congreso de Uniones
Industriales, 692 F.2d 210 (1st Cir. 1982); Westinghouse Elevators of Puerto Rico v. SIU de
Puerto Rico, 583 F.2d 1184 (1st Cir. 1978); Riverboat Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive
Bd. of Las Vegas, 578 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1978); Swift Indep. Packing v. District Union Local
1, 575 F. Supp. 912 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); Scott & Williams, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am.,
574 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.H. 1983); IBEW Local 199 v. United Tel. Co. of Fla., 112 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2666 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Salt Lake Pressmen v. Newspaper Agency, 485 F. Supp. 511
(D. Utah C.D. 1980); Typographical Workers Union v. Bulletin Co., 484 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
162. See Jacksonville Bulk Terminal v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S.
702 (1982); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Rohm & Haas, 677 F.2d 492
(5th Cir. 1982); Boston Shipping v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 659 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir.
1981); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir.
1981); New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Long Shore Workers, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980),
aff'd 457 U.S. 702 (1982); United Mine Workers v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 561 F.2d 1093 (3d
Cir. 1977); United Elec. Workers v. Honeywell, Inc., 522 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1975). See
generally Ashe, supra note 3.
163. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
164. Boston Shipping Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1066, 659 F.2d
1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981); United Elec. Workers v. Honeywell, Inc., 522 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir.
1975).
165. Howan, supra, note 15, at 66 (footnote omitted).
166. United Elec. Workers v. Honeywell, Inc., 522 F.2d 1221, 1228 (7th Cir. 1975).
While Honeywell has been cited as authority for the "strict factual identity" terminology, Oil
Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Ethyl Corp., 479 F. Supp. 953, 955 (S.D. Tex.
1979), rev'd, 644 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1981), is a better source for such terminology. The
Honeywell court apparently relied on a test of less forbidding language. Compare Honeywell,
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dard117 as a basis for reviewing arbitrable decisions.
Adhering to the teaching of Justice Douglas in the Warrior &
Gulf case, (doubts about arbitrability should be resolved in favor of
coverage), 18 courts that defer to a second arbitration decision, if the
first award arguably did not resolve the dispute, are more closely
aligned with national labor policy. 169 Federal courts that delve into
allegedly similar factual circumstances of cases or set aside arbitra-
tion decisions because they appear inconsistent with earlier holdings
are necessarily rendering judgments on the merits of the case, and
such judicial decisions usurp "a function which under the [griev-
ance] regime is entrusted to the arbitration tribunal.' 7 0
Precise language used by an arbitrator in framing an arbitration
decision may dictate the scope of its enforcement in a later judicial
action. A court may decide to enforce an arbitration award ordering
a party to cease conduct contrary to the collective bargaining agree-
ment only if some later conduct is "substantially identical" to the
original grievance that resulted in an arbitration decision. If, how-
ever, an arbitration award orders a party to discontinue "like viola-
tions," a court may feel compelled to exercise more expansive en-
forcement powers.
The fundamental concern of the judicial decisions that follow is
the message to arbitrators about the need to develop a consensus in
according precedential value to prior arbitration awards. The follow-
ing decisions are not aimed at relating a message to other courts and
522 F.2d at 1226 ("The union has not alleged that the factual basis ... is substantially
identical") with 522 F.2d at 1228 ("To the extent that res judicata (collateral estoppel) has
been used in arbitration, a strict factual identity has been required."). See also AVCO Corp.
v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 1972); Michigan Shippers v. Local 319,
Teamsters 51, 61 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2446, 2470 (E.D. Mich. 1966). See generally 0. FAIR-
WEATHER, supra note 24, at 338-46.
167. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d 1044, 1050
(5th Cir. 1981); IBEW Local 199 v. United Tel. Co. of Fla., 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2666,
2668 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
168. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583
n.149 (1960); see supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
169. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596
(1960).
170. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 569 (1960). See
also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1982). Accord Barrentine v. Arkansas-
Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 752 (1981). Cf. Spatt, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel,
42 ARB. J. 61, 63 (1987) (Justice Arthur D. Spatt stated that "the Court, not the arbitrator,
determines the threshold issue of whether a claim is barred by res judicata or collateral estop-
pel." He relied for authority on Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Scully, 98 A.D.2d 646, 469
N.Y.S.2d 400 (1983), which held that: "The threshold issue of whether a claim sought to be
arbitrated is barred under the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel by reason of the
conduct of a prior arbitration proceeding between the parties is a matter to be determined by
the court, not the arbitrator.").
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advocates. Courts have implicitly established certain expectations of
arbitrators in this area, and selected judicial decisions must be stud-
ied in order to understand these expectations and to respond to them
appropriately.
In United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Honeywell,
Inc.,171 a union brought an action in federal court for enforcement of
a prior arbitration award. The dispute concerned management's as-
signment of supervisors to perform work normally done by bargain-
ing unit members.1 72 The union had received four arbitration awards
in its favor on this subject and had "hundreds of grievances on the
issue still to be processed.
1 7"
The court in Honeywell faced the question of whether issues
previously decided in arbitration would completely bar subsequent
arbitration proceedings on additional claims involving those same is-
sues. When the union petitioned the court to avoid the arbitration
process it had negotiated into the collective bargaining agreement,
the seventh circuit observed that "it is most unusual to find a party
seeking the right to bypass arbitration procedures which it is con-
tractually bound to follow.
'174
Recognizing that the employer in the case paid the full amount
awarded by the arbitrator to the union each time the union pre-
vailed, the court reasoned that the union's complaint was inadequate
in three respects. First, there had been no attempt by the union to
aggregate the grievances into one consolidated hearing.1 75 Second,
the union never submitted a request to the arbitrator for declaratory
and injunctive relief.1 76 Third, the union did not allege that the four
prior awards were "substantially identical" to the "hundreds" of
other grievances to be processed.1 77 Since the employer's plant con-
tained many separate work areas, the court believed that a favorable
arbitration award to the effect that a supervisor should work in one
area was not sufficient to extend that arbitration decision to another
work area.1 78 Although recognizing that the facts of the most recent
grievance filed by the union were not sufficiently identical with the
171. 522 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1975).
172. Id. at 1223.
173. Id. at 1223-24.
174. Id. at 1225.
175. Id. at 1226.
176. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Honeywell, Inc., 522 F.2d 1221, 1226
(7th Cir. 1975).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1227. The four prior awards did not "foreclose an arbitrator's independent
application of the same contractual language to other situations." Id. at 1228.
ARBITRATOR'S USE OF PRECEDENT
first grievance to allow the court to declare the matter nonarbitra-
ble,179 the court held that nothing in its decision should be inter-
preted as limiting the arbitrator's power to give preclusive effect to
issues necessarily decided in the prior award. 180
The Honeywell court recognized the danger that one party to
the collective bargaining agreement might take advantage of such a
judicial ruling to breach the spirit, if not the letter, of an arbitration
award. 18' The court responded to this danger by relying on a judicial
presumption that economic efficiency would correct any such danger,
and quoted the United States Supreme Court's observation that "one
would hardly expect an employer to continue in effect an employ-
ment practice that routinely results in adverse arbitral decisions." '82
The Supreme Court's observation is in accord with the spirit of good
faith and fair dealing implicit in all collective bargaining agree-
ments, although it may not be realistic given that some parties have
continued untoward employment practices even in the face of ad-
verse arbitral decisions. Similarly, parties who face the substantial
expense in time and energy of pursuing repetitive arbitration pro-
ceedings involving the same basic issue are not comforted by arbitra-
tors' disregard for adverse decisions.'83 Such parties, however, can
take solace in knowing that they may consolidate claims in one arbi-
tration hearing and avoid rearbitrating a "substantially identical" is-
sue with regard to how a collective bargaining agreement is to be
interpreted in cases involving the same basic transaction.
2. The "Material Factual Identity" Test.-The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International
Union v. Ethyl Corp. 84 devised a new test for assessing the prece-
dential value of a prior arbitration award. The court described the
approach as a "material factual identity" test.
179. Id. at 1228.
180. Id.
181. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Honeywell, Inc., 522 F.2d 1221, 1228
(7th Cir. 1975).
182. Id. The court deferred any ruling on such a situation until those facts were
squarely before it. See also COOTER & ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMics 497 (1988).
183. The Honeywell court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Emporium Cap-
well Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 60 (1975): "One would hardly
expect an employer to continue in effect an employment practice that routinely results in ad-
verse arbitrable decisions." 522 F.2d at 1228. In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union
v. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d 1044, 1049 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit answered the Seventh
[Honeywell] Circuit by noting that hostility toward the union, relative cash resources, length
of arbitration hearings, likelihood of judicial enforcement, and possible arbitrable remedies
could encourage an employer to continue to violate the collective bargaining agreement.
184. 644 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1981).
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In Ethyl, a union sought enforcement of a prior arbitration
award as it applied to a new situation. Citing the employer's re-
peated violations of the prior award, which prohibited assigning su-
pervisors to perform bargaining unit work, the court of appeals re-
versed a grant of summary judgment that was based on the stricter
"substantial identity" test,185 used by the Seventh Circuit in the
Honeywell decision.186 The Fifth Circuit distinguished Honeywell
and rejected the more rigid "substantial identity" test.187 In distin-
guishing Honeywell, the court in Ethyl first noted that the prior ar-
bitration award prohibited "like" violations of the parties' collective
bargaining agreement.1 88 Thus, according to the Ethyl court, when
an arbitrator orders a party to stop committing a specific violation of
a labor contract and to discontinue the same or "like" violations in
the future, a court must both enforce the arbitration award and pre-
vent all "like" violations. "To do otherwise would render the arbitra-
tion award meaningless."' 89
To implement the injunctive relief set forth in the arbitration
award, the Ethyl court devised a "material factual identity" test. 9 '
That is, the court reasoned that a prior arbitration award ought to
be applied to a new dispute between the parties when the new facts
were substantially similar to, or not materially different from, the
dispute giving rise to the prior ' award.' 9' The court was sensitive
about the need to avoid the merits of the arbitration dispute'"2 and
distinguished the Honeywell decision to the extent that the union in
Honeywell had not asked for the sort of equitable relief that had
been granted by the prior arbitration decision before the court in the
Ethyl case." 3 The Ethyl court placed on the plaintiff the burden of
proving the "material factual identity" that must exist when com-
paring the facts considered by the prior arbitrator and those in the
subsequent grievance. 194
In rejecting the stricter "substantial identity" test, the Ethyl
185. Id. at 1055.
186. Id.
187. See IBEW Local 199 v. United Tel. Co. of Fla., 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2666, 2668
(N.D. Fla. 1982) ("To prevent the 'sidestepping' of a prior arbitration decision, the Ethyl
Corp. court held that a party is precluded from rearbitrating conduct that is 'substantially
similar' to the conduct condemned in the prior arbitration.").
188. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d 1044, 1048
(5th Cir. 1981).
189. Howan, supra, note 15, at 70.
190. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d at 1050.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1049.
193. Id. at 1054.
194. Id. at 1052.
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court reasoned that the test failed to distinguish the "set of griev-
ances which logically should be judicially enforced from those which
should be resolved by arbitration. 195 Moreover, the court concluded
that the test used in Honeywell was "devoid of meaning" because
the necessary passage of time between the prior arbitration award
and the next disputed conduct precluded "strict factual identity." '96
One author has described the Ethyl court's position as follows:
[TIhe court cannot avoid interpreting the collective bargaining
agreement in order to compare the past and present factual situ-
ations. For example, if the agreement prohibits all employees
within a specific job classification, irrespective of their work
grade, from operating in a certain area, then all employees
within that job classification are materially identical, regardless
of work grade. But if the agreement prohibits employees within
a specific job classification and a specific work grade from oper-
ating in a certain area, then those employees are materially dif-
ferent from other employees within the same job classification
but in different work grades. The collective bargaining agree-
ment determines which employees belong to what job classifica-
tion and work grade. The court must inevitably refer to the col-
lective bargaining agreement to determine if the facts are
strictly or materially identical. But by interpreting the collective
bargaining agreement, the court violates the well-established
principle that the arbitrator is the sole interpreter of the
agreement.
9 7
To avoid ruling on the merits of the arbitration case, the Ethyl court
devised a two-step test to determine whether disputed conduct falls
within the ambit proscribed by a previous arbitration decision. First,
the conduct must have a "material factual identity" to the prior con-
duct, differing only in form. 98 Second, the evidence must show that
the subsequent conduct is not even "arguably permissible" under the
agreement.1 99 If conduct is "arguably permissible" under the parties'
contract, a grievance with regard to the conduct must be sent back
to arbitration for resolution.2 °0
Approximately one year later, in Oil, Chemical & Atomic
195. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d 1044, 1055
(5th Cir. 1981).
196. Id. at 1054. The Fifth Circuit noted its discomfort with evaluating the merits of an
arbitration award, but does not its "material factual identity" test accomplish a similar result?
197. Howan, supra, note 15, at 78.
198. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d at 1050.
199. Id. at 1051.
200. Id.
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Workers International Union v. Rohm & Haas,2"' the Fifth Circuit
clarified the Ethyl test. In Rohm & Haas, the Fifth Circuit empha-
sized that the arbitrator whose decision it reviewed in Ethyl had or-
dered a discontinuation of all "like" violations and that the "mate-
rial factual identity" test should be applied when an arbitrator's
award included a cease and desist order with respect to infractions
like the one before the arbitrator in Ethyl. 20 2 In other words, if an
arbitrator made clear that his or her award was intended to have
prospective effect on the parties' relationship, the award should re-
ceive precedential value from a court being asked to apply it to new
circumstances. The court concluded in Rohm & Haas, however, that
all other questions ought to be resolved by arbitration. 20 3 Further-
more, when an arbitrator fails to address the prospective impact of
his or her decision, questions about the precedential value of such an
award should be returned to arbitration. Presumably, this is because
the parties have sought an arbitrator's evaluation, and not a court's,
when they entered into their collective bargaining agreement. 0 A
court that later relied on the Rohm & Haas decision described the
Fifth Circuit's approach as follows:
Only if an arbitrator's award specifically provides that it will
apply prospectively . . . or if the arbitrator's award is "inher-
ently prospective," can the award be held binding upon the par-
ties to govern future grievances. Whether the award can be
given an effect akin to res judicata or stare decisis with regard
to future disputes that may arise between the parties, neither the
district court nor this court should decide. If the parties do not
agree, that issue itself is proper for arbitration. 05
201. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Rohm & Haas, 677 F.2d 492 (5th
Cir. 1982).
202. Id. at 495.
203. Id.
204. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Work-
ers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983); Local 103 v. RCA Corp., 516 F.2d 1336, 1339 (3d Cir. 1975) ("It is
the function of the arbitrator, not ihe court, to decide whether the same question or issue has
been the subject of arbitration within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement.");
New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455, 456 (5th Cir. 1980),
affd, 457 U.S. 702 (1982); cf. IBEW Local 199 v. United Tel. Co. of Fla., 112 L.L.R.M.
(BNA) 2666, 2668 (M.D. Fla. 1982) ("The principle of labor peace and the legitimacy of
contract are not served by either party's knowledge that an arbitrator's decision will endure
only as long as the next arbitrator rules."); Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Scully, 98 A.D.2d 646,
469 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1983); Machinists v. Republican Airlines, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2690
(8th Cir. 1987); Spatt, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel, 42 ARB. J. 61, 63 (1987).
205. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. v. International Chem. Workers Union, 564 F. Supp.
1262, 1271 (N.D. Miss. 1983). See also Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v.
Rohm & Haas, 677 F.2d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 1982); Boston Shipping Ass'n v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1066, 659 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1981); New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v.
General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980), af'd, 457 U.S. 702 (1982).
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If an arbitrator does not include a cease and desist order in the arbi-
tration award, the decision should be returned to the arbitrator for a
determination as to the precedential value of the prior arbitration
award with regard to new grievances between the parties involving
similar alleged contractual violations. If an arbitrator includes a
cease and desist order in the arbitration award, it is more likely that
a court will be asked to decide whether or not there is a reasonable
correlation between the grievance resolved by the prior arbitrator
and the new dispute.
3. The "Particularly Egregious Circumstances" Test.-In In-
land Steel Coal Co.,206 the Seventh Circuit again addressed the issue
of the precedential value to be accorded a prior arbitration award.
The case involved a union that petitioned a federal district court to
enforce two arbitration awards. The district court refused enforce-
ment of the awards and granted summary judgment for the em-
ployer, concluding that the arbitration awards should receive no
precedential value with regard to future disputes between the
parties.20 7
The first dispute between the parties arose in 1977 when man-
agement sent certain workers home early while plant operation con-
tinued. 08 Management did not assign the available work to the
workers. The union maintained that it was the past practice of the
parties for the workers who had been sent home to perform the
available work.209 A grievance ensued, and ultimately, the matter
proceeded to arbitration. In 1978, an arbitrator agreed with the
union's interpretation of the past practice and ordered the employer
to pay back pay to employees who missed work as a result of the
1977 contractual violation.21 °
Four years later, a second grievance arose between the parties
involving another denial of work, which the union pursued to arbitra-
tion in 1982.11 Relying on the prior arbitration award between the
parties, the union argued that the employer violated the parties' col-
lective bargaining agreement by denying employees an opportunity
206. Local 1545, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288
(7th Cir. 1989).
207. Id. at 1292.
208. Id. at 1290.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Local 1545, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288,
1290-91 (7th Cir. 1989).
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1990
to perform the available work.21 At the arbitration hearing, the
union specifically petitioned the arbitrator to issue a cease and desist
order with regard to any future violations by management of the
employees' right to perform available work.21
The union again prevailed in the 1982 arbitration award. The
arbitrator specifically relied on the prior arbitration award of 1978
in reaching a decision.214 The arbitrator again granted back pay to
employees for work that management had denied them an opportu-
nity to perform.215 The arbitrator, however, failed to issue a cease
and desist order, despite the union's request that he do so.2 16
Five years later in 1987, a third complaint arose between the
parties over management's denial of work to employees. This time,
the union petitioned a federal district court to enforce the two prior
arbitration awards of 1978 and 1982 with regard to the complaint of
1987.217 In other words, the union wanted the federal court to accord
binding precedential value to the prior two arbitration decisions in
this new dispute between the parties. Using a "positive assurance"
test, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois refused to apply the prior arbitration awards to the new
complaint.218
The union in Inland Steel Coal Co. appealed to the Seventh
Circuit, asking the court to give precedential value to prior arbitra-
tion awards with regard to the new dispute between the parties.21 '
The Seventh Circuit analyzed the two prior arbitration decisions and
deemed them inapplicable to future complaints because the prior
awards were ambiguous about their impact on future grievances.220
The court did not address the issue of judicial and arbitral roles with
regard to whose judgment is most appropriate about the meaning of
the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The court did decide as
a matter of law, however, that three instances in ten years of deny-
ing work to employees did not constitute a willful disregard of the
prior arbitration awards.221
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1290.
214. Id. at 1291.
215. Id.
216. Local 1545, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288,
1291 (7th Cir. 1989).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1292.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1295.
221. Local 1545, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288,
1296 (7th Cir. 1989).
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In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit considered the vari-
ety of approaches used by federal courts in assigning precedential
value to prior arbitration decisions. The court implicitly rejected the
"positive assurance" test of the Third Circuit, which requires posi-
tive assurance that the prior arbitration award was intended to cover
a later dispute. 222 Absent such assurance, federal courts may give no
precedential value to the prior award. If the court lacked positive
assurance about the application of the prior award to new com-
plaints, the complainant would be compelled to pursue the new
grievance in arbitration. The threshold issue in arbitration would
then be whether or not the prior arbitration award should be ac-
corded binding precedential value, and the Third Circuit stated af-
firmatively that such a question ought to be resolved by an arbitra-
tor, not by a court. 23
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have agreed that an arbitrator
must decide whether prior arbitration decisions have binding prece-
dential value.224 As the Fourth Circuit observed: "There is solid,
well-reasoned case law holding that the preclusive effect of a prior
arbitral award is itself a question for arbitration.2 25 The Sixth Cir-
cuit stated that when there are intervening changes in facts that are
arguably significant and there is no language in the prior award di-
recting prospective application, "the issue of whether the arbitrator's
award should be prospectively applied is appropriately one for the
arbitrator to decide.
226
The Fifth Circuit, however, has not used a "positive assurance"
test to resolve doubts about the precedential value of prior arbitra-
tion awards. As seen from the analysis in Ethyl, the Fifth Circuit
has used a "material factual identity" test in order to decide whether
a prior arbitration award should receive binding precedential
value.227 The Fifth Circuit modified its approach in Rohm & Haas
by stating that a court would not give binding precedential value to a
prior arbitration award unless there was clear cut evidence of an ar-
222. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
223. See United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 5 v. Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806,
811 (3d Cir, 1981) (The court stated that it must conclude "with positive assurance" the
award or settlement was intended to cover the dispute. If the court has any doubts, the parties
should be returned to their grievance procedure and arbitration, for it is an arbitrator, and not
the court, who is to decide whether the same issue has already been resolved in an earlier
decision.).
224. See United Paper Workers v. Georgia Pacific Co., 798 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1986);
Little Six Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Local Union 8332, 701 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1983).
225. See Little Six Corp., 701 F.2d at 29.
226. United Paper Workers, 798 F.2d at 173.
227. See supra notes 184-200 and accompanying text.
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bitrator's intent that the award should apply prospectively.2 8 An or-
der instructing a party to cease and desist from particular conduct
would be evidence of such intent.229
The First Circuit has used an approach to the precedential
value of arbitration awards similar to that of the Fifth Circuit. Rely-
ing on Ethyl, the First Circuit in Derwin v. General Dynamics
Corp.2 30 used an "inherently prospective" test. That is, a prior arbi-
tration award is given binding precedential value by a court if the
prior award was inherently prospective in its outlook such that there
is no doubt in the mind of the court as to the arbitrator's intent to
make the award applicable to future complaints. In Derwin, the First
Circuit also described its plan to have arbitrators decide the prece-
dential value of awards in those cases in which there are reasonable
doubts about the prospective impact of prior arbitral decisions.23'
The district court in Inland Steel Coal Co. considered all of the
various approaches to determining the prospective impact of arbitra-
tor's decisions, and, relying on the Third Circuit's decision in United
Mine Workers of America v. Consolidation Coal Co.,2"2 used the
"positive assurance" test in deciding the precedential value to be ac-
corded the two prior arbitration decisions. Since the district court
found no positive assurance that the prior arbitration decisions were
intended to cover a later grievance of a similar nature, it refused to
apply the prior award prospectively.3 3 The arbitral decisions merited
no precedential value according to the district court.3 '
The result on appeal to the Seventh Circuit in Inland Steel
Coal Co. was salutary in that the court returned the parties to arbi-
tration as their method of dispute resolution. The court noted that
"[w]e do not believe it is necessary for us to protect the arbitral
process from repetitive grievances. 2 35 The extent to which the court
analyzed the prior arbitration awards in determining their preceden-
tial value is somewhat disquieting because the court reserved for it-
self the right to decide whether or not a prior arbitration decision
will receive any precedential value. It would have been preferable if
the court had asked whether or not the prior arbitration decisions
228. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
230. 719 F.2d 484 (lst Cir. 1983).
231. Id. at 491.
232. 666 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1981).
233. Local 1545, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288,
1290 (7th Cir. 1989).
234. See id.
235. Id. at 1296.
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demonstrated any intent to have a prospective impact and, if not, to
remand the dispute to the parties for rearbitration. Such an ap-
proach would have given the parties an arbitrator's evaluation of the
prior arbitral decisions and a determination about the precedential
value to be awarded those decisions.
The problem with the approach used by the Seventh Circuit is
that customarily, it will be difficult to evaluate an arbitration deci-
sion in a vacuum, apart from an in-depth understanding of the col-
lective bargaining relationship between the parties. The court may
not be best suited to undertake such analysis because an arbitrator is
presumed to possess the more compelling institutional competence to
provide such a contractual interpretation. Would it not be more effi-
cient as well as supportive of the American collective bargaining sys-
tem for courts almost routinely, in the absence of clear and convinc-
ing evidence, to refuse to evaluate the prospective value to be
accorded prior arbitration decisions and to use the "positive assur-
ance" test to refer such matters to the parties for processing in ac-
cordance with their grievance procedure? Only when there is clear
cut evidence of a pattern of abuse and a "bad faith" disregard of
prior arbitration awards should the court review the merits of arbi-
tral decisions to assign them precedential value.
B. Court Action to Vacate Arbitration Awards
In addition to judicial actions to enforce arbitration awards, ef-
forts to. vacate arbitral decisions have also involved courts in deciding
what precedential value to give prior arbitration decisions. For exam-
ple, the dispute in Westinghouse Elevators of Puerto Rico, Inc. v.
S.LU. de Puerto Rico,' 36 centered around whether to defer to a prior
arbitration award. Westinghouse Elevators sought to have the court
set aside an arbitration award because the arbitrator's decision di-
rectly contradicted another arbitrator's award issued six years ear-
lier.2 7 The dispute between the parties in the second case concerned
the appropriate benefits for employees working outside the San Juan
area."8 The first arbitrator awarded these workers additional pay
only if they incurred additional expenses.2 9 Six years later, another
arbitrator found a factually similar dispute to be arbitrable and held
that working outside of San Juan alone was sufficient to justify pre-
236. 583 F.2d 1184 (lst Cir. 1978).
237. Id. at 1185.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1185-86.
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mium pay.240 The employer argued before the court that the second
arbitration award failed to draw its support from the collective bar-
gaining agreement because the first arbitrator's decision became part
of the labor contract through ratification by subsequent negotiation
between the parties without any relevant change in the agreement.24'
The First Circuit in Westinghouse Elevators cited Federal
Bearing Co.24 2 for the proposition that, absent express agreement by
the parties, "an arbitrator's award rendered in a prior proceed-
ing-even between the same parties-does not stop either party from
raising the issue in a subsequent arbitration. 2 43 Notwithstanding the
court's agreement with the arbitrator's view of precedential value in
Federal Bearings Co., the court appropriately deferred to the arbi-
trator's decision in this matter.
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Warrior & Gulf 2  the
First Circuit in Westinghouse Elevators said that "it is not our task
to interpret this contract here. It is the arbitrator's job . . . . We
cannot say that the intent of the parties was so clear in this case that
the arbitrator's interpretation was 'unfounded in reason and
fact.' "245 This conclusion supports national public policy favoring la-
bor arbitration. Any other ruling would have constituted a ruling on
the merits by the court. The employer retained an opportunity either
to test the same grievance again only after a new collective bargain-
ing provision came into effect or to engage in the "give and take" of
bargaining in order to change the troublesome clause in contract ne-
gotiation. It is reasonable to believe that most arbitrators would have
concluded that the parties intended the prior award to be binding
until the clause was changed, 4 6 and the court correctly deferred to
the arbitration award.2" 7
In Bacardi Corp. v. Congreso de Uniones Industriales,4 8 the
First Circuit applied a deferral standard to approve part of an arbi-
tration award that arguably was within the arbitrator's authority to
240. Id. at 1186.
241. Westinghouse Elevators of Puerto Rico v. S.I.U. de Puerto Rico, 583 F.2d 1184,
1186 (Ist Cir. 1978).
242. 22 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 721, 725-27 (1954).
243. 583 F.2d at 1187 (citing Federal Bearings Co., 22 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 721, 725-27
(1954)).
244. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-
83 (1960).
245. 583 F.2d at 1187. See also Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers v. RCA Corp., 516
F.2d 1336 (3d Cir. 1975).
246. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
247. See Bacardi Corp. v. Congreso de Uniones Industriales, 692 F.2d 210, 211 (1st Cir.
1982) (reaffirming the position taken in Westinghouse Elevators).
248. 692 F.2d 210 (1st Cir. 1982).
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disapprove another part of the award that was "clearly erroneous"
and outside the arbitrator's authority. The prior arbitral award in-
volved the contractually negotiated pay rate when Columbus Day, a
holiday, fell on a Saturday.249 A subsequent arbitration decision in-
volved a grievance similar to the Columbus Day dispute when, thir-
teen years later, July 4 fell on a Saturday. The second arbitrator
distinguished the prior award and cited oral testimony.2 50 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment and set aside the second
award, ruling that it was irrational because of the clear language in
the collective bargaining agreement and the prior arbitration
award.251
On appeal, the First Circuit found that summary judgment by
the district court was inappropriate because the dispute between the
parties involved a question of fact with regard to the data on which
the second arbitrator relied. 252 To the extent that the second arbitra-
tor distinguished the prior award, the circuit court concluded that it
could not set aside the decision. That was consistent with the arbi-
trator's appropriate role.253 The court further reasoned that because
it was unclear how much the arbitrator relied on Puerto Rico's legis-
lative policy, it could not determine whether the arbitration award
was based on the collective bargaining agreement or legislation.25
Because the arbitrator may have impermissibily relied on Puerto Ri-
can legislative policy, the circuit court remanded the case to the dis-
trict court. 25 The court, however, affirmed the summary judgment
in part, setting aside that part of the arbitration award that gave
attorney's fees to the union. The court implicitly believed that
awarding attorneys fees was a decision that clearly exceeded the ar-
bitrator's authority.
250
C. Court Action to Enjoin Arbitration
In addition to enforcement and vacatur actions, court action to
enjoin arbitration proceedings causes a court to address the subject
of the precedential value of arbitration decisions. For example, in
249. Id. at 211.
250. Id. at 212-13.
251. Id. at 211.
252. Id. at 213.
253. Bacardi Corp. v. Congreso de Uniones Indastriales, 692 F.2d 210, 211-12 (1st Cir.
1982).
254. Id. at 213.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 214.
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Little Six Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America,2 5 7 the Fourth
Circuit refused a request by an employer to enjoin further arbitra-
tion proceedings based on the precedent that had been set by a prior
arbitration award. 58 According to the court, decisions about the
preclusive effect of a prior award are decisions to be resolved in arbi-
tration.2 95 The court stated:
It is, of course, true that numerous cases support the application
of res judicata or collateral estoppel when the losing party in an
arbitration seeks to reopen its case in federal court . ... Here
the victorious party has gone into court in an attempt to fore-
close arbitration . . . Courts will hold the parties to a labor
contract to their bargain (to arbitrate grievances).
2 60
Accordingly, by refusing to decide matters of preclusion and by re-
fusing to enjoin arbitration, the court appropriately allowed the los-
ing party to return to arbitration as its forum to attack a potentially
flawed arbitration award. Because the parties bargained for an arbi-
trator's decision in such matters, the court honored the bargain by
enforcing the agreement to arbitrate.
D. The United States Supreme Court's Approach
In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union
of United Rubber Workers of America 261 the Supreme Court consid-
ered a federal district court's deferral to arbitration when prior
awards were alleged to have binding precedential value, and unani-
mously required adherence to the standards set forth in the Steel-
workers Trilogy. 62 The litigation history in the case reflected both a
complex procedural battle, and a tension between public policy and
the doctrine of judicial deference for arbitration awards.26
In 1973, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission con-
cluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that W.R. Grace
& Co. had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.216 The
EEOC believed that the company's hiring practices discriminated
against women and blacks. 65 The Equal Employment Opportunity
257. 701 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1983).
258. Id. at 29.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
262. See supra note 7.
263. See Ashe, supra note 3, at 47.
264. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) to 2000(e-17) (1976 & Supp. IV).
265. 461 U.S. at 759.
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Commission attempted conciliation with W.R. Grace & Co., and the
union refused to participate in the conciliation process.266 During
conciliation efforts, the collective bargaining agreement between the
company and the union expired, and a strike ensued after negotia-
tions between the parties failed.267 During the strike, W.R. Grace &
Co. hired strike replacements, some of whom were women. After set-
tlement of the strike and the signing of a new collective bargaining
agreement (that ratified the plant seniority system specified in the
earlier agreement), the striking employees returned to work.268 The
company, however, also retained women strike replacements whom
management assigned to positions ahead of men with greater senior-
ity. 26 9 The men affected by this action filed grievances, but the com-
pany refused to participate in arbitration.70 Instead, the company
sought injunctive relief in federal district court asking the court to
stay arbitration of the grievance pending completion of a conciliation
agreement.171 The union brought a counterclaim, seeking to compel
arbitration. 72
Prior to a judicial decision, W.R. Grace & Co. and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission signed a conciliation agree-
ment.273 Pursuant to that agreement and while matters were still
pending before the federal district court, the company laid off some
employees. The men affected by the layoff filed grievances, claiming
a violation of the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement.2 7 This was the same agreement that had been in effect
between the parties before the strike and which had been ratified
and carried over into the new labor contract.
The district court stayed the arbitration decision and, ulti-
mately, granted summary judgment in the company's favor, conclud-
ing that the conciliation agreement superseded the collective bar-
gaining agreement and was therefore binding on all parties.2 75 The
union asked the court of appeals to overturn the lower court deci-
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 759-60.
269. Id. at 760.
270. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers of




274. Id. at 761.
275. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers of
Am., 461 U.S. 757, 761 (1983).
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276sion. While the appeal was pending, W.R. Grace & Co., again in
accordance with the conciliation agreement, laid off more employees;
and again, adversely affected employees filed grievances.27 While
the grievances were pending, the circuit court reversed the district
court and ordered arbitration of the grievances. 8
The first grievance to reach arbitration came before Arbitrator
Anthony J. Sabella who denied the grievance.2 79 The arbitrator con-
cluded that the company merely followed both the conciliation
agreement and the district court order, making it inequitable and
unfair to penalize the company under such circumstances.2 80 Al-
though the union could have attacked this arbitration award as a
decision that exceeded the arbitrator's authority (by construing the
conciliation agreement rather than the labor contract), the union did
not seek to have the arbitration award set aside. Rather, the union
contested the reasoning of the arbitrator in a later arbitration
proceeding.28 1
At this point, the union processed another grievance involving
this same issue before a different arbitrator, Mr. Gerald A. Bar-
rett.28 2 Mr. Barrett acknowledged the existence of the prior award as
well as the fact that it resolved the same contractual issue the parties
had presented to him.283 He determined, however, that he was not
required to follow the first arbitration decision.284 Mr. Barrett found
in favor of the union, stating that the collective bargaining agree-
ments made no exception for good faith violations of the seniority
provisions in the labor contract and that the company had acted at
its own risk in breaching the parties' agreement.2 85 The company
then petitioned the district court to set aside the second arbitration
award and to enjoin any pursuit of similar grievances.2 86 The district
court granted the company's request, and the union filed an
appeal. 27
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's holding, agreeing
276. Id.
277. Id. at 761-62.
278. Id. at 762. The company then reinstated the employees pending arbitration. Id.
279. Id.
280. W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. 757, 762 (1983).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 762-63.
284. Id. at 763.
285. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers of
Am., 461 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1983).
286. Id. at 764.
287. Id.
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with Arbitrator Barrett's rationale that the first award did not draw
its essence from the parties' collective bargaining agreement.2 88 The
court found the flaw in the first arbitration award to be in its refer-
ence to equity and fairness.2 89 The Fifth Circuit also rejected the
company's argument that the union waived its right to attack the
first award by not bringing a judicial action to set it aside. 90 The
court reasoned that national labor policy favoring arbitration allowed
parties to elect their method of attacking arbitration awards and that
a second award can clarify a muddled first award. 91 The court
maintained that the policy of deferring to arbitration properly placed
questions about the binding nature of the first arbitration award in
the jurisdiction of an arbitrator.2 92
On May 31, 1983, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the
court of appeals decision.29 Justice Blackmun rejected the notion
that the first arbitration award was relevant and focused almost ex-
clusively on the question of whether the second arbitration decision
should be enforced.294 Adhering to the "essence" test of the Steel-
workers Trilogy, the Supreme Court held that, regardless of the
court's contractual interpretation, collective bargaining determines
the scope of an arbitrator's authority just as it does any other con-
tractual provision.191 The scope of the arbitrator's authority in W.R.
Grace was itself a question of contractual interpretation that the par-
ties had delegated to the arbitrator. "96 Arbitrator Barrett's determi-
nation that Arbitrator Sabella exceeded his contractual authority
and that Arbitrator Barrett, therefore, was free under the parties'
agreement to render a new arbitral decision was beyond the scope of
the court's review because it comprised the merits of the case.
297
The Supreme Court stressed that W.R. Grace & Co. and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission could not unilaterally
change the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the
288. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union No. 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers
of Am., 652 F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1981).
289. Id. at 1255. Accord Local No. P-1236 v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142, 1144
(7th Cir. 1982) ("When an arbitrator bases his award on public policy considerations, he has
overstepped his authority; and the court may review the substantive merits of the award.").
290. Id. at 1258.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers of
Am., 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
294. Id. at 764.
295. Id. at 765.
296. Id.
297. Id.
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company and the union.29 By voluntarily signing both the EEOC
conciliation agreement and the labor contract, the company im-
pliedly consented to bear the risk that the district court's decision
would be overturned.299 W.R. Grace & Co. gave arbitrators much to
consider with regard to the precedential value of arbitration awards.
It is important to note that in W.R. Grace & Co. the Supreme
Court did not vacate the first arbitration award. The Court upheld
the decision of a subsequent arbitrator who ruled that the first arbi-
tration award was not binding because the initial arbitrator had ex-
ceeded his authority.300 The Court also stated that no public policy
had been violated in the second award by Arbitrator Barrett. 01 The
second arbitration award neither compelled the company to violate
the order of the district court,302 nor hindered voluntary compliance
with Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 3 3 Arbitrator Barrett
interpreted the collective bargaining agreement as preventing him
from considering public policy, 04 a question which the Court later
reserved for itself.
3 05
The result in W.R. Grace & Co. is in harmony with national
public policy favoring a labor arbitration forum as the best tribunal
for resolving labor disputes, and the Court supported this policy by
deferring to the authority of a second arbitrator to decide both dis-
putes arising under the parties' agreement and the validity of prior
arbitration awards. 06 In this respect, a second arbitrator must serve,
in part, as an appellate tribunal that reviews the soundness and logic
of a colleague's decision. This is appropriate because, from the view-
point of institutional competencies, the second arbitrator is the best
person to evaluate the validity and scope of any prior arbitration
award. Moreover, the second arbitrator is a more appropriate au-
thority to decide whether issues and claims have been precluded
from determination in the second arbitration proceeding.
The analysis set forth in W.R. Grace & Co. provides a prudent
298. W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. 757, 771 (1983).
299. Id.
300. Accord McGraw Edison, Wagner Division v. Local 1104, Int'l Union of Elec., Ra-
dio & Mach. Workers, 767 F.2d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 1985).
301. W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 770.
302. Id. at 770-71.
303. Id. at 771.
304. Id. at 765.
305. Id. See generally Ashe, supra note 3, at 47-49.
306. See IBEW Local 199 v. United Tel. Co. of Fla., 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2666 (M.D.
Fla. 1982); Glass, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int'l Union v. Deena Prods. Co., Inc.,
112 Lab. Cas. (BNA) 11,244 (1986).
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approach for federal courts to follow. 30 7 This approach not only
channels courts into their appropriate institutional roles,3 08 but also
gives judicial recognition to the importance of arbitration as a more
expeditious and responsive forum to labor-management conflicts.
IV. Conclusion
This Article addresses the arbitrator's decision making process
from an institutional viewpoint rather than an individual one. Stan-
dards must guide the decisions made by labor arbitrators, and arbi-
trators must not view themselves as venerable itinerant philosophers
who apply a limitless reservoir of wisdom to resolve labor disputes.
To help assure that arbitrators base their decisions on standards,
closer attention must be given to arbitral precedent. This does not
mean, however, that a rigid system of stare decisis, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel should be applied by arbitrators. As former presi-
dent of the National Academy of Arbitrators John E. Dunsford
stated: "To insist as a matter of principle that proceedings involving
an industrial dispute are to follow inflexibly the tenets of the adver-
sarial system is to sacrifice the distinctive interests that arbitration is
supposed to preserve.
3 0 9
A clearer consensus must be reached by arbitrators regarding
how they should arrive at their decisions. Using arbitral precedent as
a binding or persuasive source of authority encourages doctrinal sta-
bility as well as predictability. Parties seeking to settle grievances
prior to arbitration would benefit from an arbitrator's use of arbitral
precedent. A closer adherence to arbitral precedent should lessen idi-
osyncratic decisions that reflect the values of an individual arbitrator
as opposed to the rationale provided by an established body of arbi-
307. Accord Little Six Corp., 701 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1983); Bacardi Corp., 692 F.2d 210
(1st Cir. 1982); Riverboat Casino Inc., 578 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1978). For examples of cases
following W.R. Grace & Co., see Teamsters Union Local No. 115 v. DeSoto, Inc., 725 F.2d
931 (3d Cir. 1984); Office & Professional Employees v. Metro Area Transit Authority, 724
F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1984); George Day Constr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 722 F.2d 1471
(9th Cir. 1984); Lucky Stores, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local
1540, 575 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. II1. 1983); Scott & Williams, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of
Am., 574 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.H. 1983); Lodge 2167 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Leroi Div.,
574 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Mead Corp. v. International Printing & Graphic Comm.
Union, 572 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
308. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. Accord Devine v. White, 697 F.2d
421, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (The court observed that the principal characteristic of "the com-
mon law of arbitration is to show judicial deference to arbitral decisions .... If parties to
arbitration could freely relitigate their complaints in courts, arbitration would cease to be a
method to achieve prompt resolution of conflict but would instead become a new layer of
review, and a new course of delay.").
309. Dunsford, The Role and Function of the Labor Arbitrator, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J.
109, 131 (1985).
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tral principles. At a minimum, closer attention to arbitral precedent
should sharpen any differences between the facts of a particular case
and the reasoning of prior decisions.
Anglo-American common law teaches that equal treatment, fi-
nality, and stability are good reasons for giving persuasive preceden-
tial value and attributes of estoppel to judge-made decisions. Arbi-
trators should give these factors thoughtful consideration in studying
prior awards for guidance. It is reasonable to believe that, from the
parties' or an advocate's viewpoint, reliance on awards by arbitrators
is both compelling and reassuring. When confronted with prior
awards that reached conflicting conclusions, arbitrators should set
forth carefully reasoned opinions that explain their treatment of the
prior award.31
Principles of estoppel should be applied by arbitrators when one
party, without the agreement of the other, seeks reconsideration of a
valid award that foreclosed all claims on the transaction. Principles
of precedent should also be applied when either party grieves the
same collective bargaining provision during the term of a labor con-
tract, and an arbitrator should be willing to reject the prior award
under only the most compelling circumstances. If a prior award im-
plicitly has been ratified by subsequent contract negotiations and,
then, identical issues are raised in a future arbitration proceeding,
arbitrators should give binding precedential value to the prior award
until the parties themselves change the language of their agreement.
When there is an attempt to use an arbitration award as precedent
for new parties in the same industry, persuasive precedential value is
appropriate when the prior award established a rule that reflects in-
dustry expectations and practices. It should be left to the arbitrator
to decide whether the clause as interpreted in the prior arbitration
proceeding has been breached in the new situation.
When a party asks a court of law to apply a prior arbitration
award to a new dispute, the party is in reality raising an issue of
procedural arbitrability. In other words, there is a legitimate ques-
tion regarding the procedural arbitrability of the new grievance be-
cause, arguably, no one has standing to file a new grievance about a
matter that has already been resolved. A grievance is not procedur-
ally arbitrable when a prior arbitration proceeding addressed the is-
sue and issued a final and binding award. To argue that a party may
310. See, e.g., Consolidated Chem. Indus., Inc., 6 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 714, 716-17 (1947).
See also Nolan & Abrams, The Labor Arbitrator's Several Roles, 44 MD. L. REV. 873
(1985).
ARBITRATOR'S USE OF PRECEDENT
keep filing complaints about the same issue that already has been
resolved by an arbitrator undermines the meaning of the "final and
binding" provision in the arbitration clause of the grievance proce-
dure and also disturbs an efficient collective bargaining relationship
between the parties. Any judicial rule with regard to the preceden-
tial value of prior arbitration awards should have as its goal bringing
order and clarity to the collective bargaining relationship.
It generally is for an arbitrator, rather than a court, to evaluate
questions of procedural arbitrability. Hence, approaches to the prec-
edential value to be accorded prior arbitration awards that involve a
court in an evaluation of the merits of a prior or existing grievance
ought to be replaced by routine judicial procedures that send such
disputes back to arbitration. To the extent that prior arbitration de-
cisions have been incorporated into the contractual relationship of
the parties, courts usually cannot analyze prior arbitral decisions
without ruling on the merits of the dispute before the arbitrator. If,
however, courts are to return such disputes to the arbitration forum,
arbitrators need to formulate concrete principles covering the prece-
dential value of prior arbitration awards.
Reliance on arbitral precedents by arbitrators does pose some
problems. Arbitrators must understand the difficulties of a preceden-
tial system, and careless explanations of prior decisions must be
avoided. The fundamental value of focusing on arbitral precedent is
found in the principles inherent in prior decisions. These principles
represent a codification of precedents, and unsound principles still
can be rejected while new ones are developed.
Arbitrators need a rational approach to guide them through the
decision making process. Arbitrators should follow the established
body of arbitral principles that has begun to emerge in the United
States and explain the inapplicability of arbitral precedent, if such is
the case. Distinguishing precedent should sharpen arbitrators' deci-
sion making skills, and encourage a growth of arbitral principles as
arbitrators struggle with past precedent in view of social changes and
doctrinal modifications. The arbitral system would then replenish it-
self as established principles are reexamined and refined."' 1 Studying
arbitration decisions for their precedential value can help arbitrators
appreciate the interdependence of principles as well as the inadequa-
311. See generally Ashe, supra note 3, at 42 ("Finality in labor arbitration proceedings
is fundamental to the integrity and continued success of the arbitration process. Absent a
finding that statutory grounds have been violated, whether public policy necessitates a contrary
decision, the courts must confirm an arbitration award.").
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cies that may result from reaching conclusions without considering
other perspectives. Arbitration decisions should be viewed as more
than an expression of an arbitrator's individual judgment and rea-
soning. Such decisions should be examined, if possible, in light of the
"authority" of arbitral precedent and affirmed by principles set forth
in prior decisions. The efficacy of labor arbitration does not lie in
returning to early arbitral patterns set by eminent leaders such as
George Taylor or Nathan Feinsinger. Rather, arbitrators should con-
sider the desire of the parties and advocates for a conventional dis-
pute resolution structure by striving for principled decisions that pro-
mote stability, certainty, and a reasonable degree of predictability.
Attention by arbitrators to arbitral precedent is, therefore, a step in
the right direction.
